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UTILITARIANISM.¹

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WHILE we cannot regard Bentham as having founded utilitarianism as an ethical doctrine, we may rightly describe him as the founder of modern utilitarian theory. In his hands utilitarianism became a tolerably coherent position and one which exercised a definite influence on economics and on legislation. There was, indeed, no department of public life which it did not affect and into which Bentham himself did not carry it, as is seen from the record of his multifarious controversies on public matters. As Bain puts it ("James Mill: A Biography", p. 144), "Bentham had an extraordinarily ambitious mind; Aristotle was not more bent on being universally re-constructive. He aspired to remodel the whole of human knowledge; while it is very doubtful if his attainments were up to the level of his own time." There would, however, have been nothing absurd about this aspiration, if Bentham had actually discovered a universal touchstone, a means of systematising all human activities; and this he thought he possessed in the principle of utility.

Utilitarian conceptions, as has been suggested, were present in the work of previous moralists; indeed, they occupied a prominent place in leading theories, as well as in common notions of morality. Ethical theories, from the time of Socrates onwards, were largely concerned with ends, and "the moral end" was commonly conceived as some sort of general good or public interest. The question of the relation of this interest to private interests, in the form, for example, of a sum or average of the latter, appears already in the theory expounded by Glaucon in *Republic*, II, and reappears throughout the history of moral and legal speculation. The notion that society is based on the striking of such an average is, of course, exposed in the *Republic* itself, the main points being that the making of this arrangement, or any other "social contract", implies the pre-existence of society, and that the upholding of an average interest merely

¹Based on an address delivered to the Sydney branch of the Association on the occasion of the centenary of the death of Jeremy Bentham (6th June, 1832).

puts a premium upon cunning, since, if private interest is the motive at work in this compromise, no unity, no public interest, has been established.

It appears, then, that we can account for common activities only by rejecting the whole theory of interests and particularly of "self-interest", only by recognising, as Butler does, the disinterestedness of our affections. Yet we find Butler taking the view that "happiness" (the object of "self-love") is an important object of human activities; and this utilitarian strain appears in the work of the eighteenth century British moralists generally and even in the "formalistic" ethics of Kant. At the same time it is felt that virtue or rectitude is not to be accounted for on a utilitarian basis, and hence we are presented with various mixtures of intuitionism and utilitarianism. Bentham at least has the credit of trying to destroy this ethical dualism or "heteronomy", this divided allegiance to virtue and to happiness.

Intuitionism is criticised by Bentham, as one of the principles adverse to that of utility, under the heading of "The Arbitrary Principle; or the Principle of Sympathy and Antipathy" ("Principles of Legislation", ch. III). His criticism is important as bringing out the fictions and "vague generalities" by which moralistic theories are supported. "The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of right and wrong, may all be reduced to the principle of sympathy and antipathy. One account may serve for all of them. They consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's sentiment or opinion as a reason for itself" ("Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation", ch. II). It is clear enough that in appeals to moral sense or understanding or to the "fitness of things", in determining rectitude, we have "the negation of all principle" or, better, the absence of all science; and the like applies to the philosopher "who says there is no harm in any thing in the world but in telling a lie; and that if, for example, you were to murder your own father, this would only be a particular way of saying he was not your father. Of course, when this philosopher sees any thing he does not like, he says it is a particular way of telling a lie. It is saying that the act ought to be done, or may be done, when, *in truth*, it ought not to be done."

But though Bentham has shown that in these cases assertion masquerades as proof, it is not shown that his own theory is in any better a position. "What one expects to find in a principle", he says, "is something that points out some external consideration as a means of warranting and guiding the internal sentiments of approbation and disapprobation." In other words, it has to be a means of making us like something that we

did not previously like, or *vice versa*. But such a change can be "warranted" or "guided" only by reference to something we like all the time, and not to any "external" consideration. When Bentham says ("Introduction", ch. I) that the principle of utility is "that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question", he is not getting away from "internal sentiments" but is taking one internal sentiment as a guide to all others; and the guide he offers turns out to be as arbitrary as the objection to lying.

It may, of course, be contended, as is done by Sidgwick, that utilitarianism, even if it is reduced to a form of intuitionism, is still defensible in that form; that Bentham is still right in maintaining that utility provides a common measure of objects of approbation or pursuit, and not merely a common measure but a motive-force—that it is a "practical principle". But actually this is not the case. "Pleasure", as Bentham's catalogue of pleasures shows, turns out to be no more definite than "object of approval"; it is merely *that which we like or want*, and an enumeration of wanted things gives us no common measure, and no means of estimating different possible acts by reference to a *sum* of pleasures or excess of pleasure over pain (*i.e.*, how much more we get of what we want than of what we would like to avoid). Certainly, there can be an adjustment between different demands of a particular person, just as there can be between demands of different persons. But we cannot bring all demands to a single "market", and, in order to see what demands will be effective, we have to take account of the whole interplay of social forces; and as far as "quantity of pleasure" is concerned, measurement can be made only after the event. To estimate the keenness of a demand we have to see how far people are prepared to go to get it satisfied; we have to let competing demands *fight it out*.

Pleasure, then, is neither a common measure nor a motive-force; as that which pleases us it is itself a "vague generality" or fiction, on the same footing as that which our moral sense approves. And, failing as a common measure, it is no more successful than the latter (*e.g.*, in the hands of Butler) in building up a public interest out of personal preferences; though a certain "sanction" may be given to the objects of particular demands by making them *appear* to be resultants of the requirements of members of society in general. Such "common public necessities" are satirised by Chesterton in "The Napoleon of Notting Hill", where King Auberon contends that "Herbert Spencer refrained from theft for the same reason that he refrained from wearing feathers in his hair", not because of any public-

spiritedness but "because he was an English gentleman with different tastes".

The view expressed by Chesterton that "you cannot argue with the choice of the soul" is, of course, in accordance with the "arbitrary principle" which Bentham regards as opposed to any exactness in ethical science. But Bentham himself has provided nothing more exact; we could only say, in respect of "pleasures", that the outcome of the pressure of various demands will be the result of the operation of these demands, that the "market" will settle itself. But there are definite social forces, which are not measurable as amounts of a common stuff but which differ qualitatively, and which fight out the social issues. We can consider what they are and how they are situated, and get an estimate of their tendency, but we have to recognise their distinct characters. Thus Chesterton, though he also seems to make it a matter of awaiting the event, is substantially correct in recognising "the choice of the soul", *i.e.*, that there are certain things we are prepared to work and fight for. Choice may indeed be influenced, by argument or otherwise, but, if it is influenced by appeal to "our interest" or to "everyone's interest", this is a process of deception, since strictly we are only appealed to to want what we want. Bentham's "principle", that is to say, is just as arbitrary, just as opposed to scientific measurement, as are the various conceptions of the intuitionists.

Bentham substantially admits this in his account ("Introduction", ch. IV) of the balancing of pleasures and pains, *i.e.*, of the estimation, addition, and comparison of the sums, of the "degrees of *wantedness* of the various objects brought about and prevented by a particular act. "It is not to be expected", he says, "that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial operation. It may, however, be always kept in view; and as near as the process actually pursued on these occasions approaches to it, so near will such process approach to the character of an exact one." But if this has not been done and we still have passed a moral judgment, it appears that a moral judgment is not a judgment about the "general tendency" of the act in question and therefore cannot be made more exact by stating that general tendency, even supposing that this could be done. Thus Bentham not only, like other moralists, confuses between what is good and what is chosen or wanted, but also, again like other moralists, tries to secure the choosing of certain lines of action by making people suppose that these are what they really,

or more exactly, want; and so is imposed the notion of a public interest which it is everyone's interest to foster.¹

But, whatever deception the use of this vague notion may occasion, it is clear that ordinary choice takes no account of general tendencies. Bentham, then, has to find some connection between general tendencies and immediate demands, between public and private interest, between his "principle" and actual practice. He has to find some means of making his common measure work, and also has to show how we come to pass "moral judgments" at all, instead of simply seeking "pleasure" (*i.e.*, doing what we do and wanting what we want). The theory of *sanctions* is Bentham's attempt to bridge the gap. Sanctions are pleasures and pains considered as efficient causes or means ("Introduction", ch. III), and through their operation private interests can be made to subserve public interest, *i.e.*, people can be made to demand (or accept) what has a certain general tendency, what, in particular, produces pleasures as ends.

Now, apart from the question of public interest, the general position here is that demands can change, that pleasures can be annexed to pleasures or pains to pleasures, so that what was demanded before comes to be demanded more or less. In the latter case we find that something we like carries with it something we dislike, and thus we may stop demanding it. This is only to say that there can be *conflict* among a person's demands just as there can be between the demands of different persons. There is no evidence in all this that demands can be brought to a common basis, but the opposite is implied. Certainly there must be some upshot of any particular conflict, one demand can defeat another, but this is because they are for different things; and to say that the one which, in the event, is seen to have had greater *force* is thereby shown to be for greater pleasure, is simply to rob the term "pleasure" of all meaning (except one in which it would apply to all physical activities, and planets, *e.g.*, would move "for pleasure").

There can indeed be deliberation regarding objects sought, but there is no general calculus of wants. When we aim at bringing something about, we can consider the obstacles to its attainment and the ways of getting round them; we may be confronted, in the process, with things we do not want or cannot

¹We learn something about the origin of Bentham's theory from the following extracts from his common-place book (Works, Bowring's Edition, Vol. X, pp. 70, 79; quoted by Sidgwick, "Methods of Ethics", p. 88). Helvetius, he says, had "established a standard of rectitude for actions", viz., that "a sort of action is a right one, when the tendency of it is to augment the mass of happiness in the community". "By an early pamphlet of Priestley's, light was added to the warmth. In the phrase, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', I then saw delineated, for the first time, a plain as well as a true standard of whatever is right or wrong in human conduct, whether in the field of morals or of politics."

The standard, as we have seen, is neither plain nor true. But it is plain that from the beginning Bentham was concerned with establishing a standard of *rectitude*, *i.e.*, a line or lines of action which can be demanded of persons, and that the promulgation of the "greatest happiness" principle is a means of getting such demands accepted.

do, and we may accordingly give up that particular aim. Such actual or contemplated struggles have quantitative features but are not reducible to calculable amounts of a single currency, "welfare" or "pleasure". Even in calculations on a monetary basis it is qualitative considerations that settle the matter. A man may say to himself, "If I buy this book, I cannot go to the theatre or cannot have a bottle of wine with my dinner", but it is simply not the case that he estimates what he will get out of the book as quantitatively comparable with what he will get from the other sources of enjoyment. The "utility" of the objects is determined by his decision, and does not determine it. Demands, of course, go in groups; the securing of one thing enhances or diminishes the "value" of another (*i.e.*, what a man is prepared to do to get it). But there is still no total market; there are no exchange rates for all objects of desire.

It follows at once from this that the function of the legislator, who establishes the "political sanction", cannot be conceived as that of a universal calculator or seeker of "general welfare". Bentham, it may be noted, merely *assumes* that there are some whose interest is the general interest, and that such persons may be legislating. From what has been said it appears that there is no general interest, and that the legislator is simply a person who has certain demands of his own and certain special ways of getting them satisfied; in particular, that of annexing "pains" or penalties to any opposition to his demands. The people legislated for may of course resist the imposition of these penalties; and the intelligent legislator will try to calculate what resistance he will meet with and whether it will be so great as to defeat his proposals. This is a calculation of the same type as that which arises in any attempt to meet difficulties and satisfy demands. It may quite well be in the legislator's "interest", *i.e.*, it may advance his schemes, to put about the notion of public welfare and the supposition that he is acting with that object in view; he may even put it in that way to himself, but it is not so.

Bentham errs, then, in putting the legislator, as a supervisor and readjuster of pleasures and pains, on a different level from any other agent; he errs also in distinguishing the moral, political and religious sanctions from the physical or natural sanction. The operations of "public opinion", of legislation and of a man's own beliefs are just as natural as those of any non-human agency. The type of question—if you want to get or avoid A, you must accept or forego B—is exactly the same in each case. Certainly a man may mistakenly hold a view of this kind, but this, as Bentham admits, applies to all the sanctions. In particular, qualifications ("so long as this type of government persists", and the like) may be overlooked; breadth of outlook, formulation of new demands, extension of struggle, are relevant

here—but they are relevant to all the cases Bentham mentions, and they are all “natural” factors. The question is not, then, how pleasures and pains may be *made* to operate by some special functionary, but how demands do operate in relation to one another and to existing supplies. This question can be treated only in terms of social movements and struggles, and not as a matter of annexing pleasures and pains to “natural” pleasures and pains so as to secure a maximum of pleasure (or any other result).

It is to be noted that while such a movement will have its successes and its difficulties, it need not have any special activity of calculation. It is quite possible for men to promote specific objects without knowing that they are doing so. This is especially important in relation to moral theory because of the assumption that the question of goodness is linked with that of promotion. But the moral theorist, in determining what is good, is not confronted with any question of a motive for producing it. Only after he has determined where goodness is to be found, can he consider how it is caused; and not only is this independent of any consideration of how *he* can cause it, but he may find that goods do not come about by people wanting them. The political theorist, on the other hand, has certainly to take account of the operation of demands and calculations, but still his own theory is not to be regarded as a political calculation, as a consideration of how a certain movement can set about attaining its objects, what tactics it can adopt, how it can overcome opposition. It is just through confusion on this point, and on the function of the moral theorist, that Bentham is able to set up his conception of public interest (the object of demands in general or of a general social movement) and to take it as setting a standard of “approval”. But there is nothing in his theory of utility to show that there is a common interest, and there is nothing in his theory of political sanction to show that such an interest can be created.

As we have seen, Bentham assumes that the legislator is one who finds his own greatest happiness in the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Now his function of annexing penalties to acts implies that the persons for whom he is legislating find their greatest happiness elsewhere and that, by altering the balance of pleasures and pains, he can bring their demands at least nearer to his own. But in thus altering the greatest happiness of individuals he is altering the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and his own calculations will have to be begun over again. It is clear that the real work of the legislator is to make people want “the right thing”, *i.e.*, as far as possible to enforce his own demands, and that “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” is a fiction, a vague generality, which renders the enforcement easier. And Bentham himself, when he

comes to defend any institution or activity, does so not in terms of "pleasure" but on other grounds.

The appeal is most frequently made to considerations of public order. This, indeed, is closely connected with the "greatest happiness", for, if this means the least possible conflict of demands, it may be identified with the greatest possible orderliness. But, whereas "pleasure" can be passed off as something that everyone wants, the existence of social order does not show what objects are attained in the given society and whose demands they satisfy. If it is assumed that the legislator acts in everyone's interest, the desirability of order will follow. But if that assumption is not made, the attempt to show how order is or may be produced does not appear as an application of utilitarian principles, but they rather appear as cloaks for an unexamined order. In speaking ("Principles of the Penal Code", ch. V) of "seditious disturbances", Bentham advises that the magistrate should speak in the name not of the king but of justice. "Every favour, everything which bears the character of pure beneficence, ought to be presented as the personal act of the father of his people. All rigorous proceedings—those of severe benevolence—ought to be attributed to nobody. Let the hand that acts be veiled. Throw the responsibility upon some creature of reason, some animated abstraction; such as *Justice*, daughter of necessity and mother of peace, whom men ought to fear, but whom they cannot hate, and who ought always to possess their supremest homage." Advice of this kind very strongly suggests that the legislator is taken as upholding a special interest and not any "general interest".

This comes out still more clearly in Bentham's discussion of property ("Principles of the Civil Code", Part I, chs. VIII-X). That there can be no property without law, he contends, is one of the advantages of law. "Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases." That is not to say that if we take away property, law ceases; which is what Bentham is trying to prove. He goes on to say that "as regards property, security consists in receiving no check, no shock, no derangement to the expectation founded on the laws, of enjoying such and such a portion of good. The legislator owes the greatest respect to this expectation which he has himself produced. When he does not contradict it, he does what is essential to the happiness of society; when he disturbs it, he always produces a proportionate sum of evil." Apart, however, from the fact that people dislike losing their property (and this tells us nothing about society), the only evil Bentham can find to result from attacks on property is "deadening of industry", and here again he assumes, as in the case of law, that because industry has gone along with property, it cannot go without it.

To the objection that "perhaps the laws of property are good for those who have property and oppressive to those who have none", Bentham answers that poverty is the primitive condition of the human race, and that the poor in civilised society are at least better off than men in the natural state. "All participate more or less in the pleasures, the advantages, and the resources of civilised society. The industry and the labour of the poor place them among the candidates of fortune. And have they not the pleasures of acquisition? Does not hope mix with their labour? Is the security which the law gives of no importance to them? . . . All things considered, the protection of the laws may contribute as much to the happiness of the cottage as to the security of the palace." Argument of this kind to show that the poor man, although he "obtains nothing, except by painful labour", is better off than he would be in a state of nature, is not of a sort to establish any connection between property and "the greatest good of the greatest number".

Bentham's further argument makes his position still clearer. "It is astonishing that a writer so judicious as Beccaria has interposed, in a work dictated by the soundest philosophy, a doubt subversive of social order. *The right of property*, he says, *is a terrible right, which perhaps is not necessary*. Tyrannical and sanguinary laws have been founded upon that right; it has been frightfully abused; but the right itself presents only ideas of pleasure, abundance, and security. It is that right which has vanquished the natural aversion to labour; which has given to man the empire of the earth; which has brought to an end the migratory life of nations; which has produced the love of country and a regard for posterity. Men universally desire to enjoy speedily—to enjoy without labour. It is that desire which is terrible; since it arms all who have not against all who have. The law which restrains that desire is the noblest triumph of humanity over itself."

In brief, social order is equivalent to the maintenance of property, and the legislator's business is to uphold the interests of the propertied class. In his discussion ("Civil Code", Part III, ch. I) of the relations between master and servant, and with special reference to apprenticeship, Bentham says that "competition will best regulate the price of [their] mutual services, as of all other objects of commerce; and here, as elsewhere, industry should find its just reward". But most governments show a "mania for regulation" and intermeddle with businesses that they do not understand. Governments, then, should not interfere with anything that can be settled by the operation of the property system, but they should interfere with anything that would unsettle that system; they should protect property. Thus it is a matter of serving certain interests,

enabling them to work freely, "hindering hindrances" to them. And the "greatest happiness" principle merely dictates the apologetic method of emphasising (or inventing) advantages produced by these interests in any particular quarter and explaining away disadvantages (things objected to by the recipient).

The vagueness inherent in utilitarian arguments is shown in Bentham's statement of "the language of reason and plain sense" on "natural and imprescriptible rights" ("Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights"; Works, Bowring's Edition, Vol. II). "In proportion as it is *right* or *proper*, *i.e.*, advantageous to the society in question, that this or that right—a right to this or that effect—should be established and maintained, in that same proportion it is *wrong* that it should be abrogated: but as there is no *right* which ought not to be maintained so long as it is upon the whole advantageous to the society that it should be maintained, so there is no right which, when the abolition of it is advantageous to society, should not be abolished. To know whether it would be more for the advantage of society that this or that right should be maintained or abolished, the time at which the question about maintaining or abolishing is proposed, must be given, and the circumstances under which it is proposed to maintain or abolish it; the right itself must be specifically described, not jumbled with an undistinguishable heap of others, under any such vague general terms as property, liberty and the like." Here we have the utilitarian pretence at precision; but not only are we supposed to settle the issue on the basis of the "vague general" notion of what is "upon the whole advantageous to the society", but the questions of what are the general conditions of social life and what is the relation to them of government, are completely obscured.

Rights, according to Bentham, are legal rights, and it is "simple nonsense" to talk about natural rights. "We know what it is for men to live without government—and living without government, to live without rights; we know what it is for men to live without government, for we see instances of such a way of life—we see it in many savage nations, or rather races of mankind; for instance, among the savages of New South Wales, whose way of living is so well known to us: no habit of obedience, and thence no government—no government, and thence no laws—no laws, and thence no such thing as rights—no security—no property:—liberty, as against regular control, the control of laws and government—perfect; but as against all irregular control, the mandates of stronger individuals, none." It is this, however, that is "simple nonsense". Rights can certainly be established by government. But government is simply the operation of a certain set of demands. And so long

as we have demands that can be made good, demands that force a recognition of them and gain satisfaction—and this is so in any community—we have rights. Natural rights, then, will be demands which have to be made good if society is to exist. And whether or not there are such abiding rights, there are at least rights independent of law; and though Bentham thinks it monstrous to speak of “what the law, the supreme legislature of the country, acknowledged as such, *can not do!*” this is because he does not realise that law is based upon forms of social organisation, the development of which can only to a limited extent be centrally controlled.

The general position is that utilitarian theory neither *explains* nor gives any *force* to legislation (or to any other “moral” or social activity), except the force of deception. It is impossible to legislate for “pleasure”. When we talk about utility, about things being useful, we mean that they are *means* to something that we want; but to call it “pleasure” because we want it is absurd. It is absurd also to discuss politics without discussing *interests*, in the form of social movements. There are, then, two ways of supporting such a movement. One is a defence of a certain way of life; and, though this way of life might possibly be legislatively defended, we cannot assume in advance either that legislation exists to maintain it or that it needs legislative defence; the question is whether it enables demands to be made good. The other is a defence of order, welfare, public necessity and the like; and this means a defence of a way of life which is not specified.

The theoretical weakness of intuitionism has been noted; but there is still “the choice of the soul”, *i.e.*, there are movements along definite lines, seeking and finding definite objects. The attempt to get over the conflicts thus engendered by reducing these objects to quantities of an indefinite object, “pleasure”, will not serve. To say that “quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry” (though, indeed, this is in accordance with the eighteenth century estimation of poetry by its “pleasing” character) is to be guilty of moral stupidity. It will be admitted that there is a greater demand for horse-racing than for poetry, for circuses, political and otherwise, than for education. But this fact by itself gives no guidance to the moralist or the legislator, and will not weigh in the slightest degree with those who *want* education, who belong to a scientific or æsthetic movement.

What Bentham has done is to clear away a good deal of the moralising, the vague generality, that has surrounded legislative procedure. He has exposed weak talk about “sympathy” or about “eternal laws”, and has come nearer than his predecessors to showing the actual operation of demands. But he still retains a vague generality of his own (“pleasure”) to cover up

the crudity of certain demands ; he wrongly supposes a " moral " function of the legislator, a supra-scientific position of *making* things go right and of proving *by compulsion* the soundness of his intuition ; and he wrongly identifies the demanded with the good. As against this, it must be said that the good, where it exists, has to fight with the evil, however the latter may be entrenched, whatever demands it may make and however much it may be demanded.

The unhistorical character of utilitarianism, then, appears in its concealment of ethical and political struggles, and this is further exemplified in the utilitarian treatment of all psychological and social questions. To the homogeneity of objectives corresponds a homogeneity of motives, and thus all human conduct takes the form of a " reasonable " pursuit of pleasure, limited only by lack of knowledge. It is now fairly well recognised, as against this eighteenth century rationalism, that history cannot be brought under the formula of progressive enlightenment and that culture is misconceived as calculation. But it is not so clearly understood that there is no faculty of " reason " which can guide the passions, but that thinking is an activity of the passions themselves. Only the grasping of this point, however, the recognition of the diverse sentiments arising under different conditions of social life and of their reaction on social conditions, can enable us to root out the last vestiges of utilitarianism and to develop a positive theory of human affairs.

A CORRECTION.

THE article appearing in our June issue under the title *A New Non-Polarising A.C. Psycho-Galvanometer*, was contributed by Edward W. Colyer, and not by Frank Colyer.

THE BASIS OF POLITICAL OBEDIENCE.

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THIS essay is an attempt to explain the basis of political obedience in a modern democracy. I am not concerned with the ethical question: Why should men obey the law of the State?; but with the question of fact: Why do they obey it? It is not less a question of fact because we are here in the realm of motives.

The State is based on obedience to law. Other associations, such as churches and trade unions, have rules or laws, but the law of the State is supreme over the laws of all associations within its boundaries. This does not mean that the State can arbitrarily legislate either for individuals or associations, for in practice its supremacy is everywhere limited. Yet it does mean that a State law, if made, is habitually obeyed by the non-political associations. When obedience ceases to be habitual the State ceases to exist. The State alone among associations is recognised to possess coercive power for the maintenance of its laws, if by coercive power we mean overt physical compulsion. However far a political group may develop from the "police State" towards the "public service State", the maintenance of order is, both temporally and logically, the condition of its further undertakings. Hence a primary problem for the political theorist is why the majority of citizens obey the main body of the law.

I use the word "obedience" to designate a type of behaviour without making any assumptions about the motives that prompt it. In common usage the word vaguely suggests a grudging submission to an externally imposed authority. For this reason, "law-abidingness", if it were not clumsy, would be a better word.

The first thing that strikes us is the complexity of the problem. We are asking why most men obey most laws, and the form of our question implies that we are seeking a simple and generalised answer. But may it not be that men obey the same law for different reasons, and that the same man obeys different laws for different reasons? And may not the motives to obedience vary from State to State, and age to age? As circumstances change the complex of hopes and fears

and habits that lead men to obey will take on different colours. "The answer to the problem of obedience", Mr. Laski writes, "is, of course, that all theories which strive to explain it in purely rational terms are beside the mark, for no man is a purely rational animal. The State, as it was and is, finds the roots of allegiance in all the complex facts of human nature; and a theory of obedience would have to weigh them differently for each epoch in the history of the State if it were to approximate to the truth." (Grammar of Politics, p. 22.) This is a wise warning against the pitfalls of oversimplification. Yet, in spite of confusing complications, it may be possible, by restricting the scope of our enquiry, to find an answer. Firstly, we restrict ourselves to an analysis of obedience in the modern democratic State. We take such a State to possess two fundamental features, a formal political equality of its adult members side by side with a great inequality in the distribution of wealth. Secondly, we restrict the psychological scope of our question. We do not seek to enumerate all the specific impulses and beliefs that make up the complex mental attitude of obedience. We simply want to discover whether obedience rests upon free consent, and, if so, to what extent.

In the literature of political theory the problem is often stated in terms of the simple alternative: Is will or force the explanation of obedience? This dichotomous form of question is based on the assumption that if obedience is not the outcome of the force exercised by the government, it must be the expression of the will of the governed. Perhaps the question is wrongly put. Perhaps the alternatives are not so clear cut. Let us begin, however, by accepting this question as the starting point for our analysis.

Is force the basis of obedience? Before we can answer, we must know more precisely what we mean by "force". We may restrict its meaning to connote the power of overt physical compulsion which the government possesses through its control of the police. A moment's reflection will convince us that the fear of the policeman does not explain the habitual obedience of the majority of citizens. It is true that the organisation and training of the police force and the army give them a power greatly in excess of their numerical strength. It is true that when new enactments interfere with treasured habits, such as laws which prohibit or restrict the sale of alcohol, the fear of the police plays a major part in their observance. But we are not concerned to discover why the people obey this or that particular law, but why most people obey most laws. The fear of direct coercion is only effective in com-

PELLING the obedience of the minority because the majority are obedient for other reasons.

It should be noticed that it is not legitimate to ascribe obedience to force simply on the ground that it can be shown to be indirectly or historically connected with force. Consider, for example, the teaching of Sir Henry Maine: "The vulgar impression no doubt is that laws enforce themselves. Some communities are supposed to be naturally law-abiding and some are not. But the truth is (and this is a commonplace of the modern jurist) that it is always the State that causes laws to be obeyed. It is quite true that this obedience is rendered by the great bulk of all civilised societies without an effort and quite unconsciously. But that is only because, in the course of countless ages, the stern discharge of their chief duty by States has created habits and sentiments which save the necessity for penal interference, because nearly everybody shares them." (Popular Government, 6th ed., p. 53.) Now, in this passage, Maine not only fails to establish that obedience is based on the force possessed by the government, but indicates quite clearly that it depends on other factors. For he admits that it is not the conscious fear of the policeman that causes obedience in the majority of citizens of the present day, but certain "habits and sentiments". He cannot have it both ways. In so far as obedience is caused by habits and sentiments it is not caused by force. Even if he is right in claiming that these mental attitudes were themselves first created by the force which governments have exerted through countless ages, that in no way alters the fact that they are not produced by force today.

If the statement that force is the basis of political obedience is to have any useful meaning, it is essential to make two distinctions. First, is the force in question overt compulsion, such as is exercised by the police, or indirect pressure, most commonly of an economic kind? Second, does the force belong to the government, *qua* government, or to some extra-constitutional body? A body of workmen, for example, may accept a government enactment extending hours of work either because they fear refusal would involve imprisonment or because they fear it would cause a lock-out. In the first case obedience is based on the direct coercion which belongs to the government; in the second, on economic pressure from a different source. I suggest that the disagreement among writers as to the part played by force in securing political obedience is largely due to the failure to indicate clearly the nature and source of the force under discussion.

Our conclusion, thus far, is that obedience is not explained in terms of direct physical coercion. Let us proceed by elimination. Is it, then, based on will? Perhaps the most persuasive argument that political obedience, under any form of government, rests upon consent, is to be found in T. H. Green's famous chapter, entitled "Will, not force, is the basis of the State". Green contends that not even the most despotic government can impose its will without regard for the ingrained habits and traditions of the people. Custom sets up barriers which the sovereign power dare not infringe. If the sovereign seeks to break down the cherished habits of his subjects, he is bound to meet a massed resistance, which mere coercion will be powerless to overcome. The inglorious failure of King Amanulla to force Western dress upon his Afghan subjects is a picturesque modern illustration of Green's principle.

The validity of Green's argument depends upon the truth of two contentions: first, that custom sets a limit to the sovereign's powers, and, second, that custom itself rests upon the will of the people. We can accept the first contention, but must at the same time remember that even if every despot is forced to recognise the limits beyond which arbitrary rule dare not go, this still leaves a wide area at the mercy of his will. If the ruler has a powerful organised force at his disposal, he can violate the most deep-rooted customs before his subjects will be goaded out of the inertia of habitual obedience.

The second contention raises a question of the first importance for the theory of the State. Are the customs or *mores* which set limits to the power of the government themselves based on the will of the people?

A number of writers, approaching the subject from different angles and with different interests, have come to a conclusion substantially the same as Green's, that there is a law, resting on a deeper will than the will of government, which no government can either make or break.

In the *Treatise on Civil Government*, Locke is at pains to explain that there are laws embedded in the will of social man which operate in the state of nature long before they are given explicit legal form by the institutions of government. The authority of the government is limited by these laws of nature. Its whole purpose is to make their statement more systematic and precise and to provide a determinate body of men to secure their observance. It is true that Locke, in emphasising the ethical obligation of the government to make its legislation conform to natural laws, inclines to treat them as ethical imperatives rather than as social facts. Yet

his general treatment makes it clear that he believes that beneath the will of the government, and beneath the will of the majority, there is a social will upon which both are based. In other words, he believes that the power of the government depends not only upon an explicit consent once given in the past, but upon an implicit consent perpetually renewed. It is a free consent, alive to the advantages of good government, and anxious to avoid the "inconveniences" of relapsing into the state of nature. It is not, as with Hobbes, a consent into which men are dragooned through terror.

The theories of the historical school of jurisprudence point in the same direction. According to Savigny, it is useless to seek the basis of law in the authority of the legal sovereign. We must go back to custom, which is simply a common rule of conduct that expresses the communal will. Custom has not its source in statute or in legal judgments, but in the common consciousness of the people. If a government, in arrogance, enacts laws which violate custom, it will soon discover that it is impossible to enforce them.

If we pass from English and German to French theory, we there find Duguit expressing the same point of view. Rules of conduct are formed as necessary responses to social needs. They constitute the essential discipline involved in living in society. These rules constitute an objective law which the government cannot infringe. In one sense an enactment is simply the expression of the will of those who form the government. Yet it will only be obeyed if it is in accord with the public opinion of the time, that is, if public opinion recognises it to be socially necessary. "Statute is the expression of a rule which social needs are elaborating in individual consciences. Sometimes, of course, the same rule finds its first and imperfect expression in a custom to which statute gives later a more precise and complete expression. It is doubtless true that the compelling power of statute and custom is derived from the same source, but they represent different degrees of the expression of objective law." (*Law and the Modern State*, Eng. translation, p. 73.)

Among contemporary political theorists we find the same insistence that the State is based on an underlying unity of will which the ever-changing line of cleavage between majority and minority within the State in no way disturbs. Professor R. M. Maciver distinguishes three levels of will operating in the life of the modern democratic State. There is the executive will of the government; the policy directing will of the majority, which is the factual political sovereign; and a deeper communal will for the maintenance of the State. The will

of the political sovereign can only operate within the limits set by the communal will, so that "though nearly every law issues out of conflict, the system of these laws comes in the process of revision and the consolidation and readjustment of opinion to represent not merely the will of a partial and changing sovereign, but that deeper social will on which the State is based. Thus the system of the laws of a country reveals the continuous set of the social will as it is revealed by the continuous experience of age after age." (Community, p. 143.)

In analysing the "essentials of democracy", Mr. A. D. Lindsay, after explaining that although force is the *differentia* of the State it is not its essence, concludes that "no government, however democratic, can be founded on consent, in the sense of a particularised consent, and that any government, however undemocratic, is founded on consent in the sense of generalised consent". (Essentials of Democracy, p. 64.)

I refer to these writers because I am anxious not to underestimate the strength or misinterpret the nature of their doctrine. To restate it briefly: There are two kinds of law. First, there is the stream of government enactments relating to a great variety of subjects from early closing to the income tax. These enactments may often fail to win the assent of the majority of citizens, at least in an undemocratic state. In a democracy they are the sort of laws over which opposing parties can, in Mr. Balfour's phrase, "afford to bicker". Second, there are laws of a very different kind, such as those which prohibit the violation of a man's person or property. These constitute the framework of "law and order"; they rest on the consent, not only of a majority, but of virtually the whole community. From the legal aspect they may take the form of statute, precedent, or custom. They may be part of the constitution, written or unwritten. Their legal form is irrelevant. The essential thing about them is that they are the minimal conditions of the existence of government. We may, for convenience, call them primary laws, and the first class secondary laws.

We have already conceded that the power of the government is limited by these primary laws. The question before us is whether they themselves rest upon the will of the whole people. If we are not to be tripped up by terminology, we must analyse more carefully what we mean by "will". We should notice that the alternatives we are considering, will and force, belong to two quite different orders of fact. Will refers to a type of psychological process, force to a type of external situation. Thus, in the strict meaning, all action

that is not involuntary in the physical sense is the outcome of will or consent. If, taken unawares, I am pushed through a plate-glass window, my action is certainly involuntary, but if, taken prisoner, my guard assures me that if I attempt to escape he will shoot me, it is still open to me to make the attempt. It is a psychological, not a material force, that prevents me, though no doubt a material bullet would prevent escape. The important point is that in ordinary usage the word "force" does not mean external force, but the fear of a physical penalty. If, then, we are to speak of obedience as compelled by force, we must define force in terms of those psychological reactions which the threat of its exercise tends to excite. On this basis we shall say that obedience is produced by force when it is due to a physical fear to which a man will normally succumb. In psychological terms, we can make no important distinction between the fear of death or imprisonment by political authority and the fear of starvation by economic pressure.

If, then, we are to contrast force with will, it is important to recognise that we cannot restrict the term "force" to overt physical compulsion, but must extend it to include economic pressure. Otherwise the contrast is misleading, since it does not exhaust the alternatives. Yet it is desirable to distinguish between political and economic coercion. I would therefore suggest that it would be convenient, in the interests of a more precise terminology, to speak of political "force" and economic "power". My criticism of the writers I have mentioned is that, having satisfied themselves that obedience to primary laws is not produced by political force, they straightway assume that it is based on will, and thus ignore the possible alternative that it is produced by economic power. In other words, may not the citizen obey the primary laws because, economic conditions being what they are, he is unable either to alter the laws or refuse to obey them, since to do so would involve an economic penalty to which he cannot normally be expected to submit? These extra-political circumstances may exercise just as effective a pressure on the potential rebel as the hand of the policeman.

Perhaps this statement of the reasoning of the "consent" school of political theorists does not do it full justice. Certainly these writers appeal to some positive evidence in support of their view. This evidence is of three kinds.

It may be an appeal to custom. Since these primary laws are based on custom, it is argued, and custom is not the creation of government, the laws must rest on consent. But why assume that a custom is, *ipso facto*, based on the consent

of the whole community? Was slavery usually based on the will of all or the economic convenience of a class?

It may be an appeal to the observed fact of consent, or the assumption of past contract. But it is clear that the mere fact of formal consent, as shown either in daily behaviour or the ballot box, does not signify that the law is genuinely based upon the citizen's will or free consent. We cannot over-emphasise the truism that the word "consent" is almost meaningless unless we know under what constraints consent is given. For this reason all attempts to deduce consent from a theory of contract is useless unless we know under what conditions the contract was made. Just as in the economic sphere, there can be no freedom of contract unless there is equality of bargaining power, so in politics the existence of a contract between government and people would tell us nothing of the attitude of mind in which the contract was entered. It is doubtless very rare for any contract to be completely free, in the sense that the consequences of non-fulfillment would weigh equally on both parties. It would therefore be futile to attempt to restrict the words "will" and "consent" to such ideal cases. In life as it is lived, natural inequalities of men and circumstances are likely to make most contracts weigh more heavily on one party than the other. The freedom of a contract is always a matter of degree. All that we can say is that where the scales are tipped steeply in favour of one of the parties, it is absurd to call such a contract free.

The attempt may be made to deduce consent from the fact of co-operation. It is pointed out that social life is not based on conflict, as Hobbes supposed, but on co-operation, which involves the free acceptance of fundamental rules. Here, again, the argument is unconvincing. While it is true that necessity compels men to work together, it does not impose upon them any specific conditions. Is it not much more likely that these conditions are imposed by the powerful minority? The advent of the machine, for example, involves a much closer interdependence of producers than is demanded in an agricultural community. Yet it is not industrialism, but capitalism, which determines the form which that interdependence usually takes. We are not concerned with the bare fact of co-operation, but with its terms.

We arrive, then, at the conclusion that it is impossible to accept the generalisation that the primary laws of every State, whatever its form, are based on consent. It is a conclusion that results from taking too naïve a view of both force and will. Without any psychological justification, it restricts the term "force" to overt police compulsion. It ignores the

compulsive sanctions which economic conditions may provide. It fails to recognise that the only important thing about consent is the nature of the constraints under which it is given. The only possible verdict on such a theory is "Not proven". If we are to discover whether primary laws are based upon force or consent, it is necessary to examine not merely the nature of political authority, but the matrix of economic and social conditions in which the State is embedded.

The theory we have been examining claims to apply to any type of State. Let us now restrict the issue, and consider the conditions of obedience in a modern democracy. If the theory of democracy is realised in practice, we shall find that in obeying the law, the majority are simply obeying the legal expression of their own will. Government will rest upon consent.

Yet as soon as we examine the way in which democratic machinery does work, instead of contenting ourselves with a description of the way in which it is supposed to work, we find that there are two major obstructions to the effective expression of the people's will.

We are not concerned with what may be called the mechanical obstacle. It is obvious that the machinery of representation prevents the electorate from taking part in the active formulation of policy. The thirty million electors of Britain cannot corporately work out a tariff schedule or a scheme of unemployment relief. It is also obvious that since this work must be left to the party leaders, and since the main purpose of a party is to form a majority, there must be such continual compromise on all but the most vital principles of its programme, that in attempting to represent more and more people, it may come to represent less and less of what these people desire. Hence the elector's opportunity to express his will is reduced to making a choice between one of several parties, no one of which may represent more than a fragment of his political will.

It may be argued with reason that such difficulties are inseparable from a representative democracy. I mention them here only that we may be reminded how different the "will of the people" may be when it issues in the form of a government enactment from what it is in the minds of the individuals who support the government. The most formidable obstacles to the expression of the majority will are of a different nature.

The first of these is the ignorance of the mass of the people, and the fact that ignorance is, broadly, in inverse relation to wealth, for the simple reason that education costs money. During an election campaign the whole armoury

of propaganda is brought to bear on the ignorant electorate. The Press is perhaps the most effective of these weapons. Since almost every kind of propaganda involves expense, the class with most money to spend will have the greatest opportunities for moulding electoral opinion. Yet the power of the Press is sometimes exaggerated. In Britain the Labour Party achieved enough success to form the government in 1923 and again in 1929, in spite of the opposition of the greater part of the Press. In Australia there has been a succession of Labour Party majorities, although the Labour standpoint is here represented even more inadequately by the newspapers than in Britain. This does not prove that the Press is not enormously powerful, but simply that it is not omnipotent. The indisputable fact is that the great majority of electors have not enjoyed the education which enables them to understand the issues on which they vote as fully as the minority whose economic position makes a higher education possible. And just as an individual who signs a contract in ignorance of material facts known to the other party, cannot be said in any genuine sense to consent to its terms, more particularly if the other party has deliberately withheld material facts from him, so an electorate which agrees to a programme the implication of which it is unable, through lack of education, to grasp, cannot be said to have given its free consent. This is not an argument against democracy, but against inequality of educational opportunities in a democracy. The second great obstacle to the free expression of the majority will is much more directly connected with the power of money. The situation in which modern democracies find themselves today is that the political will is overcome by economic power. There are two different ways in which this power prevents the will of the people from being fully effective: firstly, by its effect on the expression of electoral opinion, and, secondly, by the limits it sets to the power of governments, though in practice these two kinds of influence constantly interact. The present position of the British Labour Party illustrates this process. From 1906 until 1931, steady and rapid growth of the Labour vote was the outstanding feature of British politics. In the 1931 General Election the vote dropped dramatically. Parliamentary Labour suffered the most crushing reverse in the history of British parties. How does such an event illuminate the workings of the will of the people? Does it mean, as it would appear at first glance, that a large proportion of the growing number of Labour voters have changed their minds about the sort of political goal they want to achieve? Throughout its history the Labour Party has stood mainly for a more equal distri-

bution of wealth. This, rather than its Socialist objectives, has constituted the basis of its appeal. Are we to conclude that a large body of voters have altered their views about the desirability of such a change, that they no longer desire the improvement in the condition of the wage-earning classes?

It is not so simple as that. It is a much longer story. So long as Labour was in opposition it was easy for both the leaders of the party and their supporters in the country to believe in the effectiveness of political power to alter economic conditions. But in 1931, a Labour Government had been in office two years. Unemployment had not diminished, wages were not higher, hours were not shorter, and trade unionists were not more free. It is true that the Government was in a minority, and that the House of Lords vitally amended some of its more important measures. But the real obstacles to success were not political, but economic. Parliamentary authority was impotent to control economic forces.

We are not, of course, concerned to pass judgment on the Labour Government or to discuss whether it might have done more to implement its policy. Nor do we accept the superficial presentation of the issue as a fight between bankers and people. We are more interested to observe the reaction of the electorate to the National Government's economy programme of wage-reductions. No one supposes that the majority of electors wanted these "cuts" in the sense that they would have consented to them if they had not felt that they were the only alternative to greater privations. The return of the National Government was largely due to their success in persuading the electorate that no political measures which a Labour Government might take to evade economies could prevent economic forces from bringing a reduction in the standard of living.

This excursus into recent politics has been made with the single purpose of illustrating how meaningless it is to say that the decision of the electorate, as registered by a majority vote, represents in a full sense the will of the people. For their will is constrained by economic conditions. If, when a workman accepts employment on terms he believes unjust, because the alternative is greater privation, his action is not proof of his free consent to the terms, then when an electorate consents to a reduction in wages because it believes the alternative to be a collapse of the currency, neither can its action be construed as free consent.

In the argument that I am putting forward everything depends on the nature of the economic forces before which the will of the people is powerless. If the economic circum-

stances of a given place and period are determined by laws outside human control, then it is waste of time to point out that they prevent the expression of free will. If the economic depression of 1930-31 was as unpredictable as an earthquake, or as uncontrollable as the movements of the stars, then, indeed, we may by a sort of euphemism say that men consent to submit to them. But if finance, trade and industry are largely controlled by a comparatively small group of men, then the struggle between the political will and economic forces is no longer seen as the senseless onslaught of the ignorant against impersonal and immovable barriers, but as the struggle of the many against the few, a struggle in which the few, except perhaps in Russia, have been everywhere victorious.

My argument here must not be thought to imply that the world economic depression of the last two years has been deliberately engineered by financial rulers. Such a theory would be absurd. Nor to imply that the prevailing economic confusion is the logical and inevitable outcome of "capitalism". Such a conclusion is satisfying in its simplicity, but is not in accord with the actual complexity of the world situation. My thesis is that the economic conditions, which set narrow limits to political power, are the unforeseen and undesired results of certain financial policies, and not of impersonal economic laws. The framers of these policies, being human, chiefly desire to increase their own wealth, but in the pursuit of this economic end they are often blinded by national sentiments, and sometimes ready to forgo a purely economic gain for the sake of what they believe to be important political advantages. Often, no doubt, they believe that to increase their own wealth is the most effective way to increase the common welfare. Yet in the final analysis it remains true that economic conditions are the outcome of policies framed by a small body of men for whom economic profit is the primary motive.

There are three ways in which this continual conflict between the political will and economic power are obscured in a modern democracy. Firstly, since economic power is able to set the limits to what the people believe to be practicable, it colours the political will at its source, before it becomes articulate. Men will not vote for a policy simply because they believe it just or desirable, unless they feel that it has some chance of success. Occasionally the battle is fought in the open, but usually a government so modifies its programme or the electorate so chooses its representatives that the risk of

open surrender of extra-constitutional authority is avoided. I am not here concerned either to praise or to blame a policy of "sound finance", but simply to point out that the criteria of soundness are not laid down by governments or by objective laws, but by the owners of wealth. This being so, we must abandon the pretence that the will of the people is supreme. The most important examples of delegated legislation are not to be found, as lawyers suppose, in the relations between Parliament and the departments, but in the restricted legislative powers which high finance permits to Parliament.

Secondly, in the last hundred years it has been possible by parliamentary methods to increase the political rights of the people, and to lessen the burden of the working-man's life. The franchise acts, the acts regulating the conditions of labour, the extension of social services, and the partial redistribution of wealth by taxation, have all borne witness to the effectiveness of political action. Democrats have often been so impressed by these achievements that they have been inclined to overlook the fact that the hierarchical control of wealth has not been materially disturbed. These social ameliorations have produced a more comfortable *modus vivendi* between the holders of economic power and the mass of the people. They have not shifted the seat of power. Democratic governments have furnished the bare rooms of the capitalist building, but they have not been able to make structural alterations.

Thirdly, the accumulation of reserves by a large proportion of wage-earning and salaried workers has eased the gradient between rich and poor, so that it is no longer possible sharply to bisect a nation into capitalists and proletarians. The extent of this diffusion of wealth can easily be exaggerated. For example, as recently as 1919 two-thirds of the wealth of England, according to Sir Josiah Stamp's estimate, belonged to less than one per cent. of the population. Furthermore, the increased diffusion of wealth has been accompanied by an increasing centralisation of its control. It still remains true that grades of wealth usually roughly correspond to grades of economic will. The members of the middle class who have been able to wrest some security from existing economic arrangements will be chary of endangering the foundations of capitalism, for they fear an upheaval which might rob them of what little they possess.

It may be objected that we are stressing the power that belongs to ownership, and overlooking the economic power which combination gives to the workers. Granting that ownership confers the right to initiate a policy, may it not be made

ineffective by a strike? The strike is certainly an important working-class economic weapon, yet it cannot be equated with the lock-out, for two reasons: first, because labour power does not enjoy the same monopoly value as control of the means of production, and, second, because, on account of the worker's slender means, his power of resistance is much less than that of his employer. "The full and monopoly value of the workers' labour", Mr. Leonard Woolf writes, "can only be converted by them into a weapon of economic war by a general strike, for it is only by the complete withdrawal of industrial labour that the monopoly power of the workers is made fully effective in the way in which the monopoly power of the property owner is made fully effective by the closing of a mine." (After the Deluge, p. 315.) Yet if a strike is really general, the cutting off of essential supplies will not only recoil upon the workers themselves, but will alienate any sympathy which the middle classes may previously have felt for their cause. The centre of the conflict then shifts from the industrial sphere and takes on the aspect of a blow directed at the rest of the community. It is not surprising that a general strike for economic ends has never been successful.

To sum up: a great deal of the discussion of political obedience fails to be conclusive because terms like "will" and "force" are not defined with enough precision. The theory that obedience is produced by force is untenable, in so far as it implies that it is produced by overt physical coercion. The theory that obedience is ultimately based on will is only true if we regard the mere fact of formal consent as psychologically significant, and ignore the duress or deception under which the consent is given. If we are to consider force from the standpoint of the psychological reactions which its use excites, we must recognise that political control through physical coercion and economic control through the deprivation of physical necessities both belong to the same order of compulsion. Both represent the triumph of power over will. The power of any government, whether democratic or undemocratic, is limited by certain obligatory customs which regulate social life. But there is no evidence that these primary laws are anywhere based on a free consent. In a modern democracy they are determined mainly by the nature of the economic structure. The economic structure or organisation is actively maintained by the owners of wealth, who are everywhere the ultimate rulers. Hence the political will of the majority is only able to choose ends and pursue policies inside the channels set by prevailing

economic constitutions. The key to political obedience is not to be found either in the force of the government, or the will of the subject, but mainly in the acquiescence of the majority to the exercise by a minority of economic power.

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This essay is solely concerned with an attempt to analyse the existing situation. It is not concerned to draw conclusions as to any likely future changes in the distribution of ultimate power, nor to advocate any particular method of attempting to produce such changes. More particularly, the conclusion I have arrived at, if sound, does not necessarily imply that because political authority has in the past been unable to control economic power, it is therefore inherently and permanently incapable of doing so. My purpose has not been to discredit the attempt to control economic processes by constitutional methods, but rather to point out that in the past such methods have only achieved partial success. Whether success in the social control of economic conditions can be won by a change in constitutional methods, or by their abandonment in favour of direct methods, is a question which lies outside the scope of this essay.

DEMOCRACIES IN THE DEPRESSION.

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THERE are two lines of escape from the depression. The first is to let prices tumble further; to adapt the standard of living by economies and by retrenchment to the fall in prices and ensuing fall in national income; to adapt the economic structure by sabotage ca' canny and dismissals to the lower standard of living; and to hope that, when prices have fallen low enough, and when world trade and production have come to a standstill, prices will begin to rise and production be resumed. The other method is to control the economic machine so that full advantage may be taken of the great potentialities of consumption that are available to the world. The first demands submission, patience and suffering; the second demands knowledge, imagination and courage. The one makes demands on the stomach, the other on the brain. Both demand faith in long term results. The purpose of this article is to consider whether democracies are showing themselves willing and competent to accept either solution.

I.

Complicated questions of the relationship of capital and labour were non-existent in the Greek and Roman worlds, while the mediæval civilisations of tradition and small scale self-contained economic units were able to remain comparatively unaffected by usual economic changes. While it is true that Greek states sometimes suffered through the debasement of the currency,⁽¹⁾ that one of the causes of Rome's downfall was the inefficiency of her monetary system,⁽²⁾ and that the Reformation, the fall of the Stuarts and the decline of Spain have been traced to the uncontrolled influx of the precious metals from the New World, nevertheless in none of these cases could the economic disturbances be traced to the positive action or inaction of democracies as we know them.⁽³⁾ On the whole, the behaviour of the Greeks threw the balance of praise on the side of democracies. "In a small democracy such as that of Athens", writes A. R. Burns, "which gave all citizens a share in the public business, the pressure of those likely to suffer by alterations (in the value of money) could

be brought more easily and directly to bear upon the authorities to discourage such a policy. The democratic Republic was, therefore, less likely to be afflicted with monetary depreciation. In the Middle Ages, Venice and Florence were most fortunate in this."⁽⁴⁾

The importance of the present depression is that it coincides with the completion of the merging of the police state of the nineteenth century into the social service state of the twentieth century. The depressions of the pre-war period disappeared by the unguided working of economic forces without any interference by the State. Stocks were consumed and people had to start buying again.⁽⁵⁾ Costs were reduced and it became possible to stimulate renewed buying without the producer being involved in too heavy losses. The flank of the depression was turned by the development of new processes in industry, the discovery of new markets, and in one way or another by industry finding new outlets in which it was possible to give full employment and still cover costs on the price received. Because there are no more markets unexploited in the pre-war sense, the opening of new processes can come only by the creation of markets inside the countries concerned, that is, by the development of semi-luxury and luxury trades,⁽⁶⁾ requiring social planning and guidance of consumption, a much more difficult problem than the expansion of production. This method we leave until later, discussing here the part that democracy has played in hindering the working out of economic forces. Professor Gregory has pointed out that the essence of capitalism must be found in the subordination of the direction which the productive effort takes to the influence of consumers' demand as expressed through an organically related system of market prices.⁽⁷⁾ If there be a glut, then prices fall, the more inefficient producers go out of existence, stocks are cleared both by the fall in prices and by the bankruptcy of producers; costs are reduced and it is profitable to produce again; as prices rise in obedience to the increasing demand, production again increases to fulfil that demand. From this point of view the most hopeful aspect in the present situation is that world trade is coming to a standstill.⁽⁸⁾ Yet instead of stocks being absorbed rapidly enough, or prices falling to the extent of carrying off stocks and discouraging production, prices and stocks have been maintained by such devices as the U.S.A. Farm Board scheme or the Brazilian Coffee Institute, and so on. Interested groups in all countries are able to obtain assistance from their Governments to carry stocks, to keep up prices or to subsidise export, so that the ordinary method of capitalism is hindered

from working itself out. If the disequilibrium between manufactured and primary products is one of the causes of the depression,⁽⁹⁾ then recovery demands either that the price of primary products be raised by destruction or restricted planting, or that the prices of manufactured goods be reduced to the level of the contracted income of the primary producer. Both are taking place only very slowly, because the rural voter obtains bounties and the city voter resists economies. A dictatorship or an oligarchy needs estimate the point of armed result against its actions; a democracy must consider the very frequent elections so that if a Ministry accepts the alternative of economy, it must extend the term of Parliament as have done Queensland and New Zealand.

The rise to power of the farmer, the post-war Green International, has prevented the liquidation of the wheat position,⁽¹⁰⁾ and this is likely to remain a source of economic disturbance for many years to come. The application of machinery and science to the production of wheat has increased the supply, while the increasing standard of living decreased the demand.⁽¹¹⁾ A League of Nations Report points out that before the depression the bumper crop of 1928 did not lead to any considerable drop in prices, and thus brought about no tendency to a restriction of wheat growing in the following year.⁽¹²⁾ The Canadian Wheat Pool and its associated organisations began in 1927 a deliberate policy of maintaining prices. "It is impossible to escape the conclusion that, in the years immediately preceding the depression, the situation in regard to supply and demand was only just beginning to lose its stability. No heed, however, was paid to the signals of warning and no adjustment attempted." The reply of all the peasant democracies of Europe to the increasing production of wheat from overseas, has been to resort to protection of one form or another in the interests of the peasant tradition. In these countries, as in New Zealand, the rural exodus, which is a result of the improved efficiency of production, is regarded as a social and spiritual calamity to be resisted by Governments. The demand for wheat is relatively inelastic, so that some transference of population and of producers is inevitable, but this will come only by a very painfully drawn out struggle by the farmers, who on the one hand will demand Government aid to prevent internal prices from falling, and on the other will try to make up for the reduced income by dumping more wheat on the already saturated market, and so upsetting further the equilibrium. The machinery of price regulation works very slowly if the response to falling prices is to increase production. What is true of wheat is partly true of sugar,

where the existence of very large stocks during certain periods has been due to protective tariff policies and bounties and other attempts to maintain prices by means of various schemes for restricting supply which have increased output and reduced consumption,⁽¹³⁾ and is true also of coffee, where the scheme to assist the carry over of crops kept up prices, expanded production, and finally ended in disaster when the coffee had to be burnt.⁽¹⁴⁾ Just as each primary producer who sees the crisis only as it concerns himself and who adopts the remedy of increased production and reduced cost, adds to the surplus and thereby brings a limited return until mankind receives the blessing of a total failure of crops, so each country sees the fall of its own national income and tries to regain world trade either by keeping out imports, or by increasing exports through a lowering of its standard of living, thus adopting a policy that must fail until other countries either suffer a famine or adopt another line of policy.

In industry, while production is falling, instead of excess capacity being eliminated by the bankruptcy of the most inefficient producers, corporations and banks have kept in existence a large number of redundant firms in the hope that trade will recover and they will be able to regain payment of the loans they have already made. The reduction of costs has thus been prevented first by the resistance of the small and weak concerns to the concentration of industry, made possible by the assistance of banks and Governments, and, secondly, by the rigidity of wage rates, made possible partly by trade unions and by State tribunals, but also by the general opposition in the community to a reduction in the standard of living.

Every election in the world since the depression has shown the effect of the opposition of the people to economies and to retrenchment. In Ireland the excitement over the oath hides the fact that the unemployment crisis gave their opportunity to the extreme Nationalists. In Japan the former Minseito Government, which was responsible for a reduction of wages and salaries of public employees, gave place to the Seiyukai, which won votes by its promises to improve trade. France and Germany move to the left. Professor M. Ansiaux takes this political discontent as one of the new characteristics of the trade cycle. "The anxious search for a saviour is a very definite indication of the degree of tension of the mass nervousness among the peoples most unfortunately treated by the crisis . . . 1931 carries the stigma of mental instability as much and even more than the years immediately following the war. Unrest threatens to undermine political life in South America, Germany and Austria."⁽¹⁵⁾ There is a return to

the ignorant emotionalism that Professor Zimmern had declared was disappearing with the improvement in the quality of the population.⁽¹⁶⁾ Is it not that the extension of the franchise gives expression to a discontent that was sullen and submerged in previous depressions? Is it not that democracy having learned in a period of prosperity to use voting power to obtain social reforms, now takes revenge on the Governments that cannot fulfil their promises of removing the depression? In Australia, every Government that has faced the electors since the depression, except Tasmania, has been defeated, while the probable Labour victory in Queensland shows how far removed is the electorate from an intelligent understanding of the case for economy. The swing in New Zealand is unmistakable, and might have resulted in a Labour victory, if the people had not seen the failure of Labour policy in Australia. Not merely, therefore, have Governments resisted the fall in prices by assisting the producers, but have resisted the fall in costs. Wages have fallen and Arbitration Courts have lowered them. Economies have been practised, and economists in Australia and New Zealand point to the necessity of reducing the gap between wholesale and retail prices.⁽¹⁷⁾ A Frenchman demands the abolition of the English unemployment insurance so that English wages may fall,⁽¹⁸⁾ but democracy generally resists the readjustment through lowered standards, and even in America the movement towards public assistance for the unemployed grows in such a way that a handicap will be placed there on the fall of wages. It may be true that if all costs could be reduced as prices fall, very little lowering of the standard would be necessary, but democracy has not shown any ability or willingness to do this. Labour parties have resisted to the point of internal disruption all economies and wage reductions. Even the very inadequate reductions of fixed charges have not been accepted by Labour as compensation for the fall in social services. It is clear now that the all round reductions that have been practised by New Zealand and Australian Governments have not been sufficient to compensate for the fall in prices of exports. Even the most orthodox financiers and economists have been unable to carry out the line of escape by readjustment, lest democracies take their revenge. What is happening is that the lowering of costs, the absorption of stocks, and the destruction of commodities are progressing so slowly that the depression deepens. The few economies that are practised, because they result in reduced purchasing power without any compensations, are merely increasing the trouble. Not merely social planning, but *laissez-faire* demands today concerted

international State action, partly for the above reason that half-way measures are of little assistance, and partly because the policy of *laissez-faire* is being hindered by the actions of trusts and cartels. Says the League of Nations Report on "The Course and Phases of the World Economic Depression": "Monopolistic regulation of prices unaccompanied by corresponding regulation of output had led to an augmentation of capacity, thus increasing the chances that the latter would outstrip demand." Even, therefore, if the democratic Governments had reduced wages so as to restore the equilibrium between wholesale and retail prices, actions by trusts might have prevented any good results from following.

II.

Democracies have resisted economies, first, because democratic action in the economic sphere had meant the bribing of interested groups with concessions, hoping that the national income would be large enough to satisfy all demands. Any conflict between groups, or any need for a national test or coordinating creed, had been avoided by the easy method of giving every group what it wanted and ignoring the costs by taxation, borrowing and a rise in prices. Australia and New Zealand have provided so many examples of this method of conciliation from pools, tariffs and wages boards to subsidies and loans that it is not necessary to pursue the point, except to mention that the method was possible only when prices were rising and loans were continuing. When the national income fell, the democracies thought it possible to continue in the same way because they had never traced the connection between the national wealth and the bribes. It was not merely that the democracy had begun to believe that taxation could continue to increase, but that it had never bothered to analyse the results and the source of the Government assistance. If, for instance, the consumer had studied the effect of the tariffs on the Australian standard of living, he would have criticised the tariff in the past, but this method of analysis was foreign to the mass of the people, partly because of the generally low standard of economic and political education, and partly because no interest was courageous enough to investigate too closely the spoils of others lest its own spoils also be questioned. It is true that since the depression, the farmer has grown critical of the Australian tariff, but it is too late, since the standard of living has become the chief article of the religion not merely of Australia, but also of United States and Great Britain. Democracy must express itself through the

social service state. Lord Passfield frankly asked of the proposal to refuse to pay unemployment relief: "How could the Labour Party, or, indeed, any one party, venture to propose suddenly to cut off the pay roll so large a proportion of the electorate?"⁽¹⁹⁾ While there is much evidence in the British elections to suggest that the electorate believed in the need for economies and was willing to retrench, it is impossible to argue that democracy was really tested, for none of the measures was of the drastic nature to justify the belief that electorates will be prepared to carry out the complete retrenchment and economy necessary, if this alternative be accepted.

New Zealand has probably gone as far as any democracy. "To be a true republican one must live under a monarchy. To be an individualist one must have experienced social control."⁽²⁰⁾ New Zealand resisted as long as possible the belief in the existence of a depression, pretended that the unemployed themselves were to be blamed for their situation, and still shows a tendency to separate the unemployed from the rest of the community by the inadequate and frequently degrading conditions of relief. The individualistic approach to the relief and cure of unemployment is due to the disillusionment and weariness of the socialistic experiments. Primary education has been assisted by the Government in every direction; but one reason why the cuts in educational expenditure were accepted with comparative apathy was that primary education had not assisted the understanding of political and economic problems. What Professor Laski says of education in general, that without it "a man is lost in a big world he is unable to understand",⁽²¹⁾ is true of New Zealand in the depression. No other country, except perhaps the United States, was more panicky at the beginning of the fall in prices, because it was so ignorant of world problems. Education of a sort had been tasted and found wanting, and instead of a new approach to education being made, education was regarded more and more as one of the frills on the social system. New Zealand ends in the ranks of the conservatives.⁽²²⁾ No longer is it a land of new experiments and social adventure. The creative impulse that launched the Compulsory Arbitration Court system, State industries, subdivision of large estates and so on has spent itself, and New Zealand has accepted more fully the implications of the way of escape through economy than any other country, because New Zealand has grown disappointed with its earlier attempts at social planning. Dull agreement and intolerant impatience with criticism have displaced the intellectual whirl of the 'nineties.⁽²³⁾ Material

benefits were achieved so easily that they began to be regarded as the main end of life, so that when material prosperity no longer followed automatically, there was neither the knowledge nor the mental ability to find a way out of the economic problem except by economies. Isolation made for complacency and stagnation; the material test, enforced through sectional bribery, demoralised the social values of the community as a whole. The importance of New Zealand in the study of democracy is that it so quickly lost its earlier inspiration of making a New World, and accepted the implications of the Old World. Yet even here the attempt to starve a way to prosperity may fail because the faith in the standard of living will prevent too drastic economies and retrenchment. So even in New Zealand we are driven to consider the possibilities of planning. The destruction of commodities that people need, the slowing down of production so that the world today is poorer as a result of the depression to the amount of thirty-five milliard dollars,⁽²⁴⁾ the method of avoiding the glut by decreasing the ability of the people to consume, can have only one justification, that the solution by planning is too difficult a one for the peoples of the world to follow.

III.

Democracy is unwilling to plan, unless tariff reform be regarded as a scientific and conscious attempt to guide economic development. In Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand the electorate refused to interfere with the private or independent working of the banks, although democracy is incomplete while banking stands outside of political control. Whether the banks acted rightly or not, is not as important as the fact that the bankers took action and made decisions that had political consequences. Accepting the view of Lord Passfield, it is clear that in Great Britain the banks demanded a cut in the rate of Unemployment Benefit as a condition of assisting,⁽²⁵⁾ and that this demand would have resulted in a split in the Labour ranks, whether it had been accepted or not. It may be true that the politicians would have acted foolishly, but so long as we retain our belief in democracy the solution is not to make that democratic machine useless by limiting its powers, but to elect the politicians that will act wisely. The Minister having considered the full facts of the position, and after consultation with his financial advisers, must have the right to use the financial forces as part of his general activity. The Government must decide, for it will be held responsible by the electorate, yet the electorate will neither give the Government full powers, nor will it excuse inaction because

of inadequate powers. Private banking has in Australia and New Zealand become regarded by the majority of the people as an omnipotent infallible State within a State. Although in other parts of the world, especially in Germany, the depression has resulted in increased interference in banking policy, in New Zealand and in Australia the electorate approves of the banks setting conditions to their assistance to governments.⁽²⁶⁾ That they have the right to do what they like with their own property does not weaken the fact that the desires and demands of the electorate are thwarted by institutions standing apart from political control. While admittedly democracy can set up institutions for the carrying out of special functions, and while the action of the agent in the particular incidents under discussion did express the general will of the community,⁽²⁷⁾ the vital point remains that the democracies turned out their government for not doing things, such as solving unemployment, which were impossible without interference with the banking agent. That democracy did not realise the connection, or, if it realised this, was afraid of its entrusting its own leaders with the power, shows the impossibility at present of democracy working out a planned economy. Moreover, if it is true that democracy cannot fulfil itself while economic power rests in the hands of private individuals,⁽²⁸⁾ it is doubly true that it cannot plan without interfering more drastically with the rights of private property. Again it is important to realise that today New Zealand, the country which, after the United States, respects private property the most, is the country that set out to build a civilisation where the rights of humanity were to be pre-eminent.

Says Laski: "Any action by the working-classes, even in a democratic state, involves risk to their economic security out of all proportion to the certainty of gain."⁽²⁹⁾ And so in Great Britain the unemployed man was afraid of losing his mite if there was "a flight from the pound", and in New Zealand no appeal was more successful than the cry that loan money would be refused or investors would emigrate if a Labour Government were returned. If this view be accepted, then a Government, even a majority Government, will be able to carry out neither the will of the people nor its own opinion of what is best for the welfare of the community. The fear of what the investing class may do will be more decisive than the votes of the people. What Professor Laski has said of Great Britain is a truthful commentary of the New Zealand and Australian situation: "This is an announcement that finance-capital will not permit the ordinary assumptions of the con-

stitution to work if these operate to its disadvantage. Socialistic measures, in a word, are not obtainable by constitutional means."⁽³⁰⁾ No believer in democracy, whatever his political point of view, can regard with satisfaction the use of the weapon of fear in political controversy, whether it be fear of the New Guard or of the investor. The cry that a Labour Government would seize the savings in the State banks was used in similar terms in recent elections in Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Labour appeals to fear of further economies; non-Labour to the fear of losing homes and savings, and panic is becoming more and more a characteristic of elections. And so the reactions against Governments, already noted, are essentially acts of fear and despair, rather than any desire to seek a scientific method of escape. It is significant that even the parties that claim to have a comprehensive plan, like the Labour Party, have raised no thrilling vision of conscious control, but have trusted in the swing of the pendulum. Labour, instead of doing its best to stampede the elector, ought to be distrustful of its acquisitions due to economies and cuts because of the necessity in a planned economy for subordinating all in the interests of the whole.

The new election cries of trusting a great man to fill in a blank cheque according to his interpretation of a changing situation must be regarded as a weakening of the desire of the people to judge for themselves and as an attempt by democracy to escape from its responsibilities. A writer in the *Political Quarterly* has declared that the ordinary German citizen, dwarfed by the great cartels, and fearful of the future, has turned more and more to the State for sympathy and safety.⁽³¹⁾ Professor Dewey has made the position of the "lost Individual" the theme of his latest book.⁽³²⁾ The complexity of the causes of the depression has therefore led, on the one hand, to over-simplification and a rush to fallacious currency patent medicines, and, on the other, to a desire to entrust the task of thinking to a leader. In Australia it is often argued that caucus or conference control is a democratic weakness as it destroys the parliamentary right of initiative and of decision, but the desire of the electorate to trust a man is just as lazy and dangerous, on the one extreme, as the device of the "mandate" is on the other. The one would destroy all political judgment by the people, the other would involve the turning of parliament into a mouthpiece of the electors. Both mean important changes in democratic practice. Neither is consistent with economic planning.

IV.

There is very little evidence therefore that modern democracies show a willingness to adapt themselves to the economic situation or to alter that situation. They have neither the patience that is demanded by the one, nor the knowledge demanded by the other. They demand the security that can come only by planning, and the freedom that has been regarded as the important element in capitalistic individualism. To attempt a justification of democracy would be to widen the scope of this article, but it seems necessary to make one or two comments. Much of the failure to solve the depression lies not so much with democracy as with the independent idea of nationalism, which has antedated and outlasted many democracies. This is perhaps why it is still the easiest method of winning elections to call oneself a Nationalist. Interested groups called themselves "the people" long before there was a democracy,⁽³³⁾ and the appeal of many groups still to obtain State assistance in the interests of "the people" is preventing the international action that might solve the problem. Corruption, as Delisle Burns points out,⁽³⁴⁾ is frequently due to the absence of conditions requisite to a democracy, although the same excuse will not meet the political corruption in Australia. We must beware of visualising perfect conditions and qualities for our democracy and then declaring that when these do not exist, that democracy does not exist, and that therefore defects cannot be those of a democracy, whereas the real problem is whether the world can ever reach the perfect state needed for the working of democracy. The test of the present depression has come before democracies have had an adequate opportunity to develop their best qualities, although in Australia, New Zealand and America there was plenty of evidence that democracy was declining even before the depression.

So the hope is to let things drift. Many economists pointed out the benefits that would follow if Great Britain left the Gold Standard, but events had to push her off, rather than any enlightened Government taking a decisive step. Commodities will be destroyed and some day prices will rise again. If conscious international action is impossible, we must put our faith in the policy of *laissez-faire*. Either, therefore, the turn of the tide will come first, or men will revolt first. If we drift along as we are doing, the first alternative solution will gradually be accepted, but before then men may have followed the Russian example to plan. The extent of the capacity for human suffering will be the decisive factor. If men will

not lose their brains, then they must restrict their stomachs. On the one extreme is the communist who sees a new order coming from the inevitable breakdown of capitalism. On the other, is the voice of the Chase National Bank, answering a question whether it will be possible to plan economic development to avoid unemployment. "There is no commission or any brain in the world that can prevent it. (You think, then, that the capacity for human suffering is unlimited?). I think so."⁽³⁵⁾ Believers in democracy are likely to have a difficult time between the two extremes.

NOTES.

⁽¹⁾ "Money and Monetary Policy in Early Times", A. R. Burns, p. 378.

⁽²⁾ "Outline of History", H. G. Wells, 1920, p. 234.

⁽³⁾ See discussion in "The Story of Money", Norman Angell, Chaps. V and VI.

⁽⁴⁾ Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

⁽⁵⁾ Professor Henry Clay, in his Halley Stewart Lecture, "The Christian World", Feb. 25, 1932.

⁽⁶⁾ Professor Gregory, in "Economic Journal," Dec., 1930; Professor Warming in "International Labour Review", July, 1931; "Britain and World Trade and Other Economic Essays", A. Loveday; MacMillan Report on Trade and Industry, p. 226.

⁽⁷⁾ "Fortnightly Review", January, 1932.

⁽⁸⁾ Sir Arthur Salter, in his Halley Stewart Lecture, "Christian World", Jan. 28, 1932.

⁽⁹⁾ "Unemployment Problems in 1931" ("International Labour Review"); Sir Arthur Salter in "Lloyd's Monthly Review", March, 1922; MacMillan Report, p. 129; Professor Gregory in "Fortnightly Review", Nov., 1931.

⁽¹⁰⁾ R. R. Enfield in "Economic Journal", Dec., 1931.

⁽¹¹⁾ "Unemployment Problems in the United States", H. B. Butler, pp. 41, 63.

⁽¹²⁾ "The Course and Phases of the World Depression", p. 64.

⁽¹³⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁽¹⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁽¹⁵⁾ "Revue d'Economie Politique", Nov., 1931.

⁽¹⁶⁾ "Political Quarterly," January, 1930.

⁽¹⁷⁾ *E.g.*, Report of Economic Committee, New Zealand, Feb. 24, 1932.

⁽¹⁸⁾ "Revue d'Economie Politique", March, 1931. Criticised in "International Labour Review", December, 1931 and "Revue d'Economie Politique", Nov., 1931.

⁽¹⁹⁾ "Political Quarterly", January, 1932.

⁽²⁰⁾ General Manager of Bank of New South Wales reported in "Battle of the Plans", Ed. Copland and Shann, p. 67.

⁽²¹⁾ "An Introduction to Politics", p. 37.

⁽²²⁾ *Cf.* "The American Road to Culture", G. S. Counts, pp. 120, 134-5.

⁽²³⁾ See especially recent restrictions of the political activities of civil servants.

⁽²⁴⁾ W. Woytinsky in "International Labour Review", January, 1932.

⁽²⁵⁾ "Political Quarterly", January, 1932.

⁽²⁶⁾ *E.g.*, Report of the Bank of New South Wales, 1931, "Battle of Plans", pp. 21, 28, 67.

⁽²⁷⁾ Hattersley in "A Short History of Democracy"; "Democracy will be logically complete when the action of the agent corresponds closely with the general will of the country which he represents", p. 6.

⁽²⁸⁾ Laski in "Introduction", p. 23.

⁽²⁹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁽³⁰⁾ "Political Quarterly", October, 1931.

⁽³¹⁾ *Ibid.*

⁽³²⁾ "Individualism Old and New."

⁽³³⁾ "Modern Civilization on Trial", p. 149.

⁽³⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

⁽³⁵⁾ "Survey Graphic", March, 1932.

VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE IN AUSTRALIA, 1932.

A REVIEW OF PRACTICE IN THE EDUCATION DEPARTMENTS OF THE STATES.

By G. R. GILES,

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INTRODUCTION.

DR. MARTIN'S stimulating review in the December issue of this Journal is inclined to leave one with the feeling that vocational guidance is something which we may hope for, but which has not yet seen the light of day. Such, however, is far from being the case. Four of the six States in the Commonwealth have instituted, through their Education Departments, more or less comprehensive schemes with the object of directing exit pupils towards suitable life work. Whilst in no instance is attention given to every one of the six problems mentioned in Dr. Martin's interesting article, the States of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia have in hand plans which, when brought to fruition, will include adequate provision for development along the lines indicated.

GENERAL TENDENCIES.

Vocational guidance, as a systematic movement, is of comparatively recent growth in Australia. Though many individual schools and teachers have endeavoured in a spasmodic and haphazard way to help young people in their entry into industry and commerce, all efforts were hampered by lack of reliable information and until a very few years ago, by a failure officially to recognize the responsibility of the schools in this regard. Now four of the States have schemes of some kind in operation, in which definite attempts are made to overcome this deficiency in the educational programme. Each State has its distinct line of attack on the problem of the choice of a career, problems, complicated, as pointed out by Walker in 1931,¹ by many economic difficulties. Bearing these criticisms in mind, each State's scheme reveals interesting points to the student of educational and social questions.

The resemblances are to be found in the attention paid to the collection of information over a period of years concerning

¹THE AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, Vol. IX, No. 1, March, 1931, pp. 64-66.

the child's attainments, abilities and traits, and in the provision of occupational data. The vocational advice eventually given is thus based on a more or less comprehensive cumulative record. Each State also provides information relating to the conditions, prospects and qualifications required for the various callings and has built up a "placement" organization included in which is some attention to "follow-up" work.

The main point of difference comes in the views taken of the possibility of embarking upon a vocational guidance programme without providing a special bureau for the examination of children to whom advice is given. Victoria, South Australia, and Queensland consider that the teacher to whom information regarding the requirements of occupations has been made available, is capable of advising children with some measure of success. New South Wales, on the other hand, believes that vocational advice should be based mostly on the results of psychological tests and observations.

The width of the programme is another point of variation. Victoria is alone in its State-wide programme, embracing all schools, rural and urban, and including all pupils, those who complete a post-primary course and those who do not. The remaining States confine the operations of the vocational guidance programme to certain sections of the educational system.

Apart, however, from these expressions of individuality the general plan of vocational guidance in Australia follows a somewhat common course. Guidance in the choice of a post-primary school is the first stage in the plans, followed at a later date by advice as to the most suitable career. To a varying degree attempts at placement are made, and in some instances after-care is included.

The co-operation of parent and child is sought. Certain States place reliance upon the child's expressed preference, whilst others give more attention to the desires of the parent. In all States the teacher's opinion is held in high esteem.

Psychological examination on a large scale is not a feature of the schemes, with the exception of that of New South Wales, and the projected one of Queensland. Ratings by teachers on the results of examinations and school history are preferred in the remaining States.

VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE IN NEW SOUTH WALES.

The vocational guidance scheme of the Education Department of New South Wales centres round the bureau which has been specially set up for the purpose in Sydney. The staff consists of a superintendent, a trained psychologist and the

necessary clerical assistants. The procedure is somewhat as follows :

Boys and girls who have completed their third year in the post-primary course in the metropolitan area or who have attained the age of sixteen years, are interviewed by appointment, when they are subjected to a series of psychological tests. Vocational guidance is given on the results of these tests, which are supplemented by the information contained on the Cumulative History Cards.

These cards are filled each year for every pupil who transfers from a primary to a post-primary school. The card gives a record of progress in the different school subjects, of punctuality, of conduct *et cetera*. Space is provided for the head teacher to indicate the type of course which he thinks the pupil may follow with profit ; thus educational guidance comes to have its place. No attempt, however, is made to give vocational guidance by the head teacher or by any one connected with the primary school.

The second part of the cumulative record makes provision for progress in post-primary work. This record is more detailed and is entered each year. Teachers are asked to express an opinion upon character and temperamental qualities, to state whether home conditions are normal or otherwise, and to define the interest taken by the child in hobbies and sports. The child is also asked to make a first and second choice of vocation, and the parent is requested to express his or her desire in this connection, while the teacher is required to state his opinion of the suitability of the choice.

The final page of the folder contains space for reports of Rotary Committees. These Committees consist of teachers, and they follow the pupil through the school. By the introduction of this system two common difficulties in the administration of a wide scheme are overcome : the transfer of teachers (for there will always be some member of the Committee remaining for a sufficiently long period at the school to know the pupils intimately), and the difficulty of securing personal contact with the pupil. This difficulty is overcome by the method of allocating pupils to committees. The staffs of the secondary schools are divided into as many groups as there are years in the course. On arrival, each student is placed under the care of one of these Committees and remains with the Committee throughout the whole of his school career.

The personnel of these Committees is determined by the head master, who takes into account the need for continuity of the Committee's policy in the observation of pupils and the desirability of members coming from the different subject groups. To these bodies is given the responsibility of ensuring that the entries on the History Cards are made. It is suggested

that each member of the Committee should familiarize himself with the possibilities for students in a group of occupations, and by this means the work of each teacher is lightened, and more detail secured than if each member were required to cover all vocations.

Having obtained this information from the school—a composite judgment from a number of competent authorities on each topic—the Bureau is in a position suitably to advise and to place students who have been referred to it.

The objects of the Bureau are somewhat comprehensive. Attention to each phase of its plans means that the staff of four is kept fully occupied. These objects are :

To advise parents as to the natural aptitudes of the children so that after the completion of their primary course they may be directed into the class of school which would help best in the development of their natural ability and tend to qualify them for the work in which they are likely to have the most interest.

After the ordinary school education has been completed to advise them more definitely as to the occupations which appear to offer the best prospects for them.

To assist in securing suitable employment.

To advise pupils as to the advantages of further education with a view to better qualifying them for the work upon which they have entered or are about to enter.

To keep in touch with employers for such a period as will render it possible to ascertain definitely their suitability or otherwise for the work.

To take whatever action is necessary in the way of vocational adjustment in cases where unsuitability occurs.

To counsel each student who is referred to an employer as to the class of work he is likely to meet in the position he is seeking ; to point out to him the defects as revealed by the tests and examination to which he has been submitted ; to encourage him to think for himself by endeavouring to anticipate the questions he is likely to be asked when under examination by his prospective employer.

Employers soliciting juniors receive a number of prospective workers, any one of whom would be suitable for the task. As far as possible, the bureau refrains from making the final choice so as to remove all possible suspicion that it is working in the interests of any particular individual. Employers are also furnished with detailed particulars of the qualifications of every one who is referred to them, and upon these particulars and their own examination they make the final selection. Many associations of employers before considering any applicant for employment refer him to the Bureau for examination. If he is

found suitable for the work, he is registered for consideration in connection with any future vacancies.

The final decision is the result of a further and more searching examination planned to discover the definite vocational interests, to assess the value of such qualifications as personality, address, and other traits of character. Defects which would be regarded as disqualifications for any special type of work are carefully noted. A careful study is made of the industrial conditions obtaining from time to time, so that when boys and girls are aiming at occupations that are already overcrowded, they may be warned of the possible consequences if they persist.

A regular contact is also maintained with employers so that a correct estimate can be formed as to what they regard as essential qualifications for each class of work.

Any special action that is necessary to grapple with the problem of the unemployed youth is regarded by the Education Department as the function of the Vocational Guidance Bureau.

In order to meet the abnormal situation which exists owing to the present unsatisfactory economic conditions, it has been found necessary to arrange for a continuation of the training of those boys and girls who are not likely to succeed in obtaining immediate employment. In those cases where positions have been lost and some action is necessary to protect boys and girls from the dangers of enforced idleness, special classes have been formed.

The Bureau is also co-operating with welfare workers in connection with all schemes that have for their object the provision of organized games and training facilities as an antidote for the many dangers of juvenile unemployment.

In order that the whole of the existing avenues of employment may be surveyed, an economic adjustment committee has been established to assist the Bureau in placing boys and girls at present out of employment. In addition to this specific task, the Committee will advise the Government as to the possibilities of opening up new avenues of employment, if it is found that the existing ones are incapable of absorbing the total number of young people out of employment.

The magnitude of the operations of the Bureau may be gauged from the fact that, during the last year, about 2,500 boys and girls were dealt with, in addition to the work involved in its association with the bodies referred to above.

The scheme of New South Wales is thus essentially based on the activities of the central Bureau. It is not so in the other States, to a consideration of which we now turn.

THE VICTORIAN SCHEME OF VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE.

Vocational guidance in Victoria is regarded from a wider point of view than that which presupposes the application of a

battery of psychological tests or the arrangement of a series of interviews as the main planks in the platform of the movement. It is considered that helping boys and girls to make the best use of the school facilities so that they may be fully equipped to make their contribution to society, is an integral part of the scheme. Individual vocational service based on an appreciation of the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship in a democratic community epitomizes the philosophy of the movement.

To the Chief Inspector of the Education Department, Mr. J. McRae, is due much of the credit for the crystallization of public opinion on the need for vocational guidance. After his experiences abroad in 1926-27, he became the apostle of the movement, and as a result of his advocacy, an influential committee was appointed in 1929 to advise the Education Department on its introduction of a scheme of vocational guidance. On this committee were teachers and inspectors of schools, business men and women, labour leaders and representatives of leading public bodies. After due consideration, a scheme was recommended and put into operation towards the end of 1929, in the 2,700 schools under the control of the Department of Education.

As a result of this plan attention to the future career occupies its place in the closing years of school life, and in this work three problems are considered :

1. The problem of the choice of a suitable post-primary course of study. (At about twelve years of age.)
2. The problem of the choice of a suitable career.
3. The problem of placement in the chosen calling.

1. *Educational guidance* comes to the fore in the early part of Grade VI (the sixth school year), after which the various post-primary courses begin. It is therefore of fundamental importance that the child be guided towards the course which most suits his needs, and to secure this result, the first part of the scheme is directed. Parents and teachers are asked to help the child to make some decision as to his future career before reaching the end of this grade. This does not mean that he is forced to choose a career at this early age, but that the avenue in which the future life work will be found is to be decided. The choice is made from professional and commercial occupations on the one hand and from industrial and rural callings on the other, with, in the case of girls, the addition of careers in home-management.

Two letters are issued by the Department to the parents of all children in this grade. In the first circular, published in May, the minds of the parents are directed to the need for consideration of the child's future, while in the second folder,

issued in December, appears particulars of the various schools and post-primary courses.

In Grade VI entries are also commenced on the record card which accompanies the child throughout the remainder of his school career. Particulars of educational, personal and physical import are entered at regular intervals and form the basis of guidance at the two stages.

This card system is the nucleus of a cumulative record and is super-imposed on the existing systems of the schools. The cards, while not too complex, supply a background of information of great value to the teacher giving guidance.

Entries continue to be made for some years; in general they are made right through the post-primary course and for two or three years after leaving school.

Talks by teachers on the choice of a new school are regularly given at the end of the year, while towards the end of November the Vocational Guidance Officer broadcasts a series of lectures on the educational opportunities in Victorian schools.

Arrangements are now being made for the selection in each large school of one member of the staff to exercise the oversight of the vocational guidance programme and thus to ensure greater efficiency in all sections of the work.

2. *Vocational guidance*, in the sense of advice in the choice of a suitable career, receives attention in the next two years. During the seventh and eighth grades, every child is under special observation. The first of these years in the new post-primary course (planned, but not yet in operation) will be common to all types of schools, it being believed that the atmosphere of the school will exert an intangible, but none the less important influence on the minds of the pupils. Opportunity will be given in the new scheme for the decision made at the beginning of the year to be modified, if found necessary, without loss of time to the pupil.

A short course of occupational civics has been introduced into these grades, being compulsory for all pupils. A general outline of the workers of the State is given in Grade VII, and in Grade VIII a detailed study of a number of occupations of interest to pupils is undertaken. Throughout the course, emphasis is placed on the dignity of labour, and occupations are studied from the aspect of service to society. Suitable textbooks for pupils and teachers are now in the hands of the publishers.

Besides the regular lessons by teachers, lectures by representatives of various occupations, visits to factories and business establishments, and film displays have been included in the supply of occupational information. All children receive at the end of their Grade VIII course a small folder on careers, which sets out the main facts concerning a number of common

occupations. In the official bulletin of the Department, the *Education Gazette*, which circulates monthly among the schools, a section has been allocated for vocational guidance. Here are published instructions to teachers, and in each issue a detailed study of some one occupation appears.

After two years of such occupational information it is expected that parents and children will have some fairly good idea of the occupation desired. Children leaving for work at about the age of fourteen are given assistance and advice in the choice of a career, while those remaining at school receive further educational guidance.

This stage involves on the part of the teacher an intimate acquaintance with the child and with the occupational world. The first he undoubtedly possesses, since the record card includes a brief summary of the outstanding points in the development of the child. But what of the second? Counsellors in other parts of the world are given time to become acquainted with industry and commerce, but not so the Victorian teachers.

This apparent weakness is overcome by the provision of the information mentioned above, and by the formation of an advisory committee for each school, constituted similarly to the Juvenile Employment Committees of Great Britain, or the Employment Committees of Austria.

In rural schools a committee of three is customary, while in urban schools seven is the usual number. Each committee includes representatives of the teachers and of the employing community. This organization ensures that the advice given will be based on an intimate knowledge of the local employment conditions as well as on accurate data concerning the child.

The duties of these committees are comprehensive enough to tax the resources of any body of workers. It has been laid down that they are to assist in school conferences with leaving pupils and parents; to assist the head teacher to ascertain what vacancies exist in the locality; to advise pupils and parents concerning openings, conditions and prospects; to assist in actual placement in industry and to develop schemes of after-care.

If such committees were permitted to work independently, particularly in the metropolitan area, wastage of overlapping effort would result. To prevent the possibility of such wastage and to co-ordinate the efforts of each district, what are termed "Advisory Councils" have been formed.

These Councils usually exercise supervision over all schools in the municipality and include representatives of the various educational institutions in the area under their control, municipal authorities, employers, employees and other bodies which are able to give useful and accurate information concerning the employment possibilities of the district.

The duties of the Councils are of an executive and organizing character. They have the responsibility of co-ordinating the work of the various advisory committees in their area, of collecting and disseminating occupational information, and in general ensuring that the schools are brought prominently into the industrial and commercial life of the district.

The supervision of the whole system is in the hands of the writer, who is directly responsible to the Chief Inspector of the Department. In addition to the organization of the movement research in the matter of educational and vocational guidance, the preparation of occupational guides and pamphlets, and the training of teachers in the principles and practice of vocational guidance are included in the duties of this office.

3. *Placement*, even in the present difficult times, is most encouraging, and owing to the efforts of the committees and councils, many young people have received an excellent start in life. Over forty councils have been formed in various parts of the State and all have performed magnificent public service.

The success of the work in guidance and placement is not confined to urban or provincial centres. The Charlton district reported that of 151 children leaving the 130 rural schools within its boundaries in 1930, all but 3 either went on to higher education or were suitably placed. Similar results are reported from all parts of the State, though in a number of cases not such a low percentage of unemployed young people is indicated.

A recent extension of the vocational guidance work is the provision of special educational facilities for unemployed boys and girls. In a number of centres special classes have been organized by the Advisory Councils to cope with this problem. No cost to the Department is incurred, as all are locally financed and staffed by volunteer teachers, departmental or otherwise.

4. *General*. Arrangements have now been made whereby all teachers passing through the training colleges will receive some explanation of the different types of schools and of the methods to be applied in the giving of vocational advice and assistance. Those in the field receive at regular conferences suggestive lectures from the leaders of the movement, and monthly articles in the official Gazette.

A special course in educational and vocational guidance is included in the curriculum of all secondary schools, covering the five years in those institutions.

The Victorian scheme of vocational guidance is therefore essentially an educational implement which will help the child adjust himself to school and to society with benefit to himself and connections, and aims to reach every child in every school in all parts of the State.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA'S SCHEME OF VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE.

In South Australia a scheme of vocational guidance has been put into operation for the benefit of all pupils who have completed the primary courses (usually at about thirteen years of age) and have enrolled at a departmental super-primary school. A scheme of placement has been devised for the benefit of boys and girls attending such schools in the metropolitan area and who have completed not less than two years in a post-primary course.

The organization of the scheme is of a three-fold character : In the first place there is a system of recording the history and potentialities of each child handled in the scheme, not only from the scholastic, but also from the physical, moral and social, aspects.

The second portion of the scheme involves the compilation of a record of all potential or actual vacancies in workshops, factories, banks, offices, shops, government departments, *et cetera*, with the requirements, outlooks and opportunities as far as they can be determined in each case.

The third step is that of linking up the schools and the scholars on the one hand, with the employers and the work on the other. The ultimate aim is to get the right boys and girls into the right work, *i.e.*, the positions for which they are most suited both by ability and by inclination.

The first action taken is the transmission of a letter from the Director of Education to the parents of each boy and girl sitting for the Qualifying Examination (at end of the primary course). This letter contains particulars of the various types of post-primary schools and serves to introduce the problem of the choice of a career to the family councils. The head teachers and the class teachers of primary schools are required to advise, guide, and assist as far as possible the students who are proceeding from the primary schools to higher courses.

A card system is brought into operation when the child enters the super-primary school. On this uniform record are entered each term the marks, position in class, *et cetera*, and other information which will enable the teachers to give advice concerning the choice of an occupation. The teachers form the Advisory Committee which is entirely a Departmental, *i.e.*, school, body.

The head teacher is designated Chief Counsellor of the school advisory committee. A counsellor, who is an assistant teacher, is appointed for every 100 (in some cases 50) children, and class teachers are assistant counsellors.

The child is not subjected to any psychological tests and is not asked to express his preference as to the choice of a vocation. Guidance is limited to an expression of agreement or

disagreement with the desires of the parent. The scheme therefore differs from those in operation in New South Wales and Victoria, where the plans are definitely positive in their aim to discover a vocation suitable for the child.

A well-sustained effort in occupational analysis has been carried out in this State, as in Victoria. Each issue of the official circular to schools, the *Education Gazette*, has a vocational guidance section in which careers for boys and girls are discussed. It is proposed at a later date to collect these articles into a handbook of vocational guidance information. These articles aim at giving concise and accurate information regarding the mode of entry, remuneration, prospects, *et cetera*, for the different occupations open to young people.

The committee appointed to carry out the departmental scheme of vocational guidance is composed of representatives of the different types of super-primary schools with the medical officer and psychologist when necessary, and is under the general direction of the Superintendent of Technical Education.

The procedure of placement centres round the compilation of an annual "merit" list. This is compiled at each school and shows, for the pupils seeking employment, their scholastic and other qualifications, the first and second choice of occupation, and type of position for which each is recommended, and other factors which will enable the Central Placement Office readily to sort out the different young people.

The Central Placement Office seeks to maintain contact with employers of all types in all parts of the metropolis and to submit suitable juniors for vacancies of which it has been notified.

During the two years that have elapsed since the introduction of the scheme, South Australia, in common with the other States, has been passing through a period of economic difficulty, consequently the placement portion of the scheme has not progressed to the extent anticipated. A useful scheme, however, has been built up which will assist boys and girls in the transfer from school to work.

THE QUEENSLAND SCHEME.

Queensland's scheme is the most recent to be put into operation, for in March, 1931, a vocational guidance committee, consisting solely of departmental officers and teachers, was appointed to introduce a plan. When the announcement was made that the Education Department in this State proposed to inaugurate a scheme of vocational guidance, it was stated that a committee representing all interests would be appointed by the Minister. Members of the committee, however, felt

that it would be wiser to bring into operation first of all that portion of the scheme in which the schools would function.

The committee realized that it might be helpful, especially in providing information about the peculiar characteristics and aptitudes demanded by the different occupations, to have outside assistance, but its ultimate decision always was that that portion of the scheme in which the schools would function should be brought into operation and experimented with first of all and that in this experimental stage the Department should be untrammelled by any influence which such a committee might exert. The committee therefore set itself the task to inaugurate this part of the scheme and to test it as early as possible so that any flaws might be detected and improvements effected before the general scheme was introduced.

After the consideration of all information available, the committee decided that :

1. The recorded study of the child should commence at the age of twelve years or the sixth grade, whichever is the earlier in the child's life, two years before the normal date of leaving the primary school.
2. That a suitable card system to define the information deemed most useful for the vocational study of the child should be devised.
3. That the aim of the study should be to afford satisfactory educational guidance to those proceeding to a secondary course and to afford definite vocational guidance to those entering employment at fourteen years.
4. That provision should be made for follow-up work in the case of those who pass into employment direct from the primary school, principally to assist those who have entered dead-end occupations, to find suitable and stable employment.

The activities are at present limited to the nature of a small experiment in four primary schools, these being sufficiently varied in character to provide a fair average sample of the types of children likely to be met in the metropolitan area.

The card used is similar in outline to those in operation in the other States, having space for particulars about educational progress, physique and personality traits. The educational record was entered from the school records, the physical record by the Departmental medical officers after a special medical examination of the children experimented upon. Colour vision was tested by the head teachers, using the Ishihara test.

To assist the teachers to analyse the fundamental traits of vocational import, a questionnaire was submitted to the parents. By its means, there was also obtained from the parents

their desires concerning the occupations they would like their children to follow, how long they would be prepared to keep them at school, and what influence, if any, they would be able to use in placing them.

A similar questionnaire was submitted to pupils. These replies enabled teachers to discover the child's true vocational desire. They also supplied information which was not normally in the possession of the teacher and which gave further assistance in making an estimate of the child's temperamental qualities.

The method of procedure adopted by the four primary head teachers was not uniform. In one school, the questionnaire was sent out to parents, and the scholars were asked to answer their enquiries after only a brief explanation had been given. In another school, the head teacher's aim was to prepare the minds of the children beforehand. Talks, at least weekly, on the aim of vocational guidance were given by the head teacher. The wisdom of carefully investigating an occupation before entering it was stressed, and then a rough outline of the points to be considered in such an investigation was given. Each child was required in this way to investigate the occupations in which he was most interested. These occupational analyses were read in class and discussed, the work being correlated with composition. As a consequence of the soundness of this preliminary action it could reasonably be claimed that when later the children were asked to express a choice of occupation and to give reasons for their choice they did so with as mature a judgment as it is possible for a child to display.

A psychological examination was also included in the experiment. Each child was tested by the same intelligence test as was used by the National Institute of Industrial Psychology in its now famous vocational guidance experiment. At the same time, each child was subjected to a group test of clerical ability, the one employed being that devised by Dr. Philips and used at the Vocational Guidance Bureau in Sydney. A third test, a group test of mechanical ability, was arranged and administered to all pupils. In this test, five different articles had to be assembled in fifteen minutes. The test was designed to determine whether a boy was possessed of distinct mechanical ability or whether he was definitely deficient in that respect. No attempt to grade the intermediate types was made.

The tests were found to be of the greatest assistance to teachers in coming to conclusions regarding vocational fitness.

In spite of the disadvantages of too short a period of time being devoted to the experiment, too rapid carrying out of the testing programme, and the limited time available for the consideration and weighing of the evidence, the information enabled definite guidance to be given to a large number of pupils.

Plans for 1932 include the repetition of the experiment in a much greater number of schools, so that in the near future a comprehensive vocational guidance scheme will be in operation in Queensland schools.

In the light of the experience already gained, it appears that the scheme of guidance in Queensland will include the following distinct steps :

1. An intelligence test in Grade VI.
2. Explanation and preparation before the child or its parent is required to make any occupational decisions.
3. A questionnaire to parents in the seventh school year.
4. A medical inspection during the period of investigation.
5. A test of colour vision during the sixth school year.
6. A written decision concerning the pupil communicated to the parents, preferably in the form of a standard reference.

Inherent in such a plan are arrangements for special guidance to pupils reaching the age of fourteen before the end of the period, the testing of clerical and mechanical ability by departmental officers, the formation of an employment committee for each school, with a monthly report of placements, to the central office, and the provision of information in the *Education Office Gazette*.

The plans in this State will be watched with interest, as they differ from all the others in the emphasis placed on psychological and medical examination as the basis of guidance and the attempt to provide expert assistance to every child in the metropolitan area without the establishment of a costly central office.

TASMANIA'S CONTRIBUTION TO VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE.

In the island State of Tasmania, while no departmental scheme is in operation, an interesting experiment conducted by a citizen body in the northern city of Launceston is worthy of attention. This committee was formed by two men who realized the frequency with which youths entered occupations for which they were unsuited. After some difficulty a number of people interested in the work were gathered together and a number of case studies made.

After each scholar filled in a questionnaire seeking information concerning the interests, hobbies and pastimes, likes and dislikes, he was interviewed by three independent members of the committee, each of whom furnished an individual report. A report from the school was made available to the investigators as well as the child's questionnaire, and then the advice was given.

No opportunity has presented itself for making follow-up studies, but so far the method shows promising results.

CONCLUSION.

Vocational guidance in Australia, as has been evidenced above, is still in the initial stages. Each State has its own problems and is directing its attention to the solution of these difficulties, but follows the general procedure indicated in the opening remarks.

Though temporarily hampered by the economic crisis which affects the Commonwealth as it does other nations, vocational guidance has materially contributed to the welfare of the adolescent, and judging by the indications in every State, will continue to help young people in their introduction to the conflicts of occupational life.

A NON-HIERARCHICAL MATHEMATICAL LOGIC.

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- §1. Introduction.
- §2. $\varphi(\varphi\hat{x})$, $\varphi(\varphi x)$, and the Theory of Types.
- §3. Paradoxes of the Second Group, and the Hierarchy of Orders.
- §4. Conclusion.

§1

THE solution of the paradoxes of mathematical logic is generally held to necessitate the introduction of various hierarchies, of type, of order, *et cetera*. It is the purpose of this paper to show that hierarchies may, and should, be dispensed with entirely. The chief results here obtained are :

- (1) $\varphi\hat{x}$ is precisely defined, and from the consideration of its definition alone follow the required properties of $\varphi(\varphi\hat{x})$.
- (2) The paradoxes of Ramsey's second group⁽²⁾ are shown to depend upon purely logical principles ; and the notion of order, whether of a proposition, or a meaning, is shown to be unnecessary for their solution.
- (3) Hierarchies are shown to be not only unnecessary, but in any case useless.

The simplification of mathematical logic due to these results is better appreciated if we consider how much of recent discussion has been confused by vague ideas of function, or by considerations of type.

As I indicate in §2, the fundamental definition there given is due largely to Ramsey, who, however, did not appreciate the implications even of the more limited definition which he gave in his paper referred to ; but the treatment in §3 of those paradoxes, previously solved by ideas of "order", is, I believe, quite original.

The distinction, in short, between the logic here presented, and that of "Principia", is this : that in the latter work, restrictions on the functions and "totalities" came from

The symbols used in this paper have meanings as follows : $\varphi\hat{x}$ is any function (*vide* §2), x any argument, and φx the correlated value of $\varphi\hat{x}$. $(x)\cdot\varphi x$ and $(\exists x)\cdot\varphi x$ are the propositions which assert that all, and some, of the values of $\varphi\hat{x}$ are true. So that $(x)\cdot\varphi x$ and $(\exists x)\cdot\varphi x$ are both, in general, false by our definition.

something other than themselves, in fact, from a complex machinery of hierarchies ; while here, *e.g.*, they come from the nature of the function itself.

§2

Ramsey⁽²⁾ introduced the notion of "function in extension" which I generalize as follows : We define to be a function any one-one correlation, of arbitrarily chosen objects (individuals, propositions, correlations), to arbitrarily chosen propositions. The *definiens* is a primitive idea in our logic ; special cases of the *definiendum* are "elementary" and "predicative"^{(1) (2)} functions. The objects are the arguments of the function, the propositions, its values, and if all the objects are propositions, we arbitrarily define which set is to be values, and which arguments. I give this definition because I hold that analysis reveals every function to be a correlation. It will be agreed that a function is not other than a correlation, but functions are usually treated as more than correlations. But, since we know functions that are simply bare correlations, anything more than a correlation that a concept is discovered to contain must be irrelevant to its functional character, if it has one.

In the ordinary use of the concept "function" no careful distinction is made between correlation and rule of correlation, and this failure to distinguish two very different things leads to the belief that functions "take" arguments, which in turn confuses discussion of the theory of types.

Given a rule of correlation, we are continually finding new objects to be correlated with some proposition ; the process of correlation is going on, objects are, in a sense, being "taken". But once the correlation is complete, it does not take arguments, it has them. While we are using the rule, and the process of correlation is unfinished, we can say arguments are being "taken", but we should remember that the function, the completed correlation, doesn't yet exist. Once the process of correlation is complete, the function exists, but the process of "taking" arguments is over for good. Only the rule of correlation "takes" arguments, the function simply has them. In fact, an object neither can nor cannot be an argument of a *given* function, it either is or is not. A function neither takes nor does not take a given object as argument, it either has it, or has it not, as argument.

The question we must now ask is not, can a function take itself as argument, but, has some function itself as argument. And the definition given is sufficient to answer this question.

Consider some function which is among its arguments. Call it *A*. Then since *A* is itself in the correlation which constitutes it, it involves a correlation, which is yet *A*, and which is

such that A is among its correlata. This new correlation is among its own correlata, and we thus obtain an infinite regress of correlations. In fact, since a function presupposes its arguments (by our definition) to suppose a function among its arguments is to make the existence of the function a condition for itself, and thus provide an infinite regress of conditions, removing the function from the sphere of practical discussion.

We see then that to suppose a function among its arguments is to suppose an impossible state of affairs; and to assert that any particular function is among its arguments is self-contradictory, and launches us on an obviously endless search for that function. It is also easy to see that if anything presupposes a function, it cannot be among that function's arguments. We assert then that $\varphi(\varphi\hat{x})$ is meaningless.

The important point of the discussion so far is this: that no considerations of type have entered at all. The non-significance of $\varphi(\varphi\hat{x})$ follows simply from the definition of $\varphi\hat{x}$, and no machinery of hierarchies is needed. The discussion depends on a precise description of $\varphi\hat{x}$, which was impossible in "Principia Mathematica", since the description of $\varphi\hat{x}$ there given ("abstraction from an abstraction") was so vague. (Cf. Langer.⁽³⁾)

For the case of $\varphi(\varphi x)$ I proceed as follows: Consider a function $\psi\hat{x}$ defined by the correlation

$$\begin{array}{l} a \dots \dots \dots p \\ b \dots \dots \dots q \\ c \dots \dots \dots r \end{array}$$

where a, b, c are any three objects, and p, q, r any three propositions: so that ψa is p , ψb is q , ψc is r . If, then, d is any thing other than a, b , or c , what is the meaning of ψd ? It must obviously be non-significant. Now in general, the sets $\{x\}$ of the arguments, and $\{\varphi x\}$ of the values, of a function are mutually exclusive, so that $\varphi(\varphi x)$ is non-significant. The precise treatment of $\varphi(\varphi x)$ in the other cases must depend upon $\varphi\hat{x}$ in each particular case. But no contradictions can arise from $\varphi(\varphi x)$.

Here again we must notice the irrelevance of type considerations. The initial choice, which determines the arguments and values of the function, is arbitrary, except for the convention, itself arbitrary, which limits values to propositions, and the limitation, that our statements must make sense, have meaning, so that functions arguments of themselves are ruled out. Hence, if φd is meaningless, we cannot say that d and the arguments of $\varphi\hat{x}$ are of different type.

We may ask: does not the idea of type enter when we deal with the rule of correlation? for this "takes" arguments, and we ought in some way to recognize the limitation of arguments

we know to be necessary. But as before, this limitation will come from the nature of the things we deal with; and I cannot see that a rule determines anything but the arguments; it certainly *says* nothing about type. But apart from this, the introduction of types is incapable of solving any problem. If we are to avoid circularity, when we say that the arguments "taken" by a rule (say *A*) constitute a type, there must be some rule (say *B*) to which we refer implicitly as determining the type. (Here I take the type to be a certain enumeration of terms, which it certainly is, though it may be more than an enumeration.) We can only guarantee that the arguments "taken" by *B* constitute a type by another rule, "and so *ad infinitum*". If we say that *B* needs no further rule to back it up, neither does *A*, and the notion of type becomes redundant. The idea of type, in fact, instead of solving our difficulties, simply increases them, and renders the paradoxes undiscussable.

(For a discussion of logical functions different to mine or Russell's, see Reference (5); but Johnson's conclusion there depends on verbal confusions: his results concerning descriptive functions will not bear close examination. And we may notice that in Vols. I and II his introduction of "types", and "orders", are quite arbitrary.)

§3

Ramsey⁽²⁾ treated the second group of paradoxes in a way fundamentally different from that of any other writer. Russell's solution⁽¹⁾ of these paradoxes, he said, introduced the idea of the "order of a proposition", but although the Axiom of Reducibility⁽¹⁾ apparently did away with the advantage due to this introduction, it did not reinstate the paradoxes. This and other considerations led Ramsey to look for the solution of the paradoxes in the element of meaning which, he asserted, they all contained. Right here we meet an anomaly. Ramsey declares that "meaning" is not a part of logic, in the sense of a symbolic system, and immediately proceeds (*a*) to symbolize "meaning", (*b*) to assert that the nature of "meaning" in any particular case depends upon the structure of the symbol meant. Apart from the consistency of this procedure, I wish to draw attention especially to assertion (*b*). It is doubtfully true, and leads just as surely as does "order", to a hierarchy.

My discussion, on the other hand, depends upon the idea of enumeration,⁽⁴⁾ and we ask, is some enumeration among its terms?

Suppose we have such an enumeration, say *A*.

Then since it is among its enumerata, there is an enumeration, which is yet *A*, and of which *A* and its terms are enumerata. This too must be among its terms, and hence we

get an infinite regress of enumerations, which we traverse unendingly in the search for A . It also follows by an argument similar to that in §2, that an infinite regress of conditions must be fulfilled in order that A can exist. In short, to refer to an enumeration "which is among its own terms", is to refer to something that can never be found, and to assert that some enumeration is among its terms is self-contradictory. As before, we see also that whatever presupposes an enumeration cannot be among its terms.

All this, of course, implies no reason for asserting that an enumeration and its terms are of different "orders". And in fact, hierarchies of "order", as much as hierarchies of type are powerless to effect a solution of our problem. If the terms of an enumeration are of a given order, this order must be determined either by a rule, when we repeat the objections of §2, or by another enumeration. The order-determining character of this enumeration must be guaranteed by introducing yet another, and we get an infinite regress. Order, like type, either renders our problem insoluble, or is redundant, and hence in any case useless.

The second group of paradoxes⁽²⁾ all contain a reference to some "totality", or enumeration; and the contradictions emerge when we attempt (illegitimately, as I have shown above) to make something, that depends upon an enumeration, one of its terms. In the "heterologisch"⁽²⁾ paradox, "heterological" contains an enumeration of predicates, and of things meant; and we derive the paradox by making heterological one of the enumeration upon which it depends. In Richard's paradox⁽¹⁾ we have a definition dependent on an enumeration of definitions, in the "Cretan", there is a proposition dependent on an enumeration of propositions; so the solution of the contradictions is obvious.

This discussion of enumerations leads to the conclusions (1) $(x) \cdot \phi x$ is not of different order from $\phi a, \phi b, \text{ et cetera}$; (2) it is not one of them, this latter in direct contradiction to Ramsey's result.

Conclusion (1) obviously removes all need for the Axiom of Reducibility.

§4

We see then that hierarchies are not only unnecessary but useless, that a non-hierarchical logic presents a much simpler and neater discussion of the paradoxes.

My discussion adds nothing new; correlation and enumeration were always, so to speak, embedded in mathematical logic; I have simply isolated them, free from irrelevant concepts, and shown that consideration of them alone leads to solutions of our difficulties.

The results of this paper raise some interesting questions. There is first, the changes effected in the general synthesis of mathematics from logic, which will be great ; secondly, and more particularly, there are two generalizations of the concept function. (1) An admission of objects, not propositions alone, to act as values. (2) A correlation might be considered as an enumeration of one-to-one correspondences between two objects. Such correspondences can also be enumerated along with other objects, and we obtain a pseudo-function, in which some objects are simply enumerated, others correlated.

These two generalizations will, I believe, play an important part in the discussion of "structure", arithmetical or logical.

On the other hand, there are more general questions, as, for example, what view of logic, realist or instrumentalist, is supported by the results of mathematical logic ? I have here adopted a pragmatic standpoint ; and it seems to me that many of the arguments employed in this paper, and others very similar, support an instrumentalist view of logic. I hope to touch upon these questions in a later paper.

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IN PURSUIT OF THE OBVIOUS.

By I. SUTHERLAND,
Melbourne.

THE conflict between thought and experience is in the first place a matter of general observation, but it is particularly evident when we turn our attention to theories of the state and its functions. Art, science, and philosophy, which order the realms of the spirit, seem fated only to disorder the practical world with various disturbing doctrines. Art has sponsored a more or less violent, more or less articulate anarchism, socialism is the (possibly illegitimate) offspring of science, while philosophy has produced its reactionary theories of the state. More recently, the philosophy of M. Bergson has been blamed for the excesses of French syndicalism and in general "evolutionary" philosophies centring round the concept of Change or Becoming seem most likely to produce dangerous revolutionary movements. If we wish to avoid these unreasonable complications we must consider more attentively the claims of experience, not forgetting the special value of history, which is the experience of the race.

It is natural that theories of the practical should concentrate largely on the State, as the most powerful and successful modern institution. In philosophical theory particularly, the State easily assumes the rôle of the ideal Institution, or even appears as the embodiment of Absolute Goodness. Study of the past, however, soon convinces us of the historic majesty of the Church, and helps us toward a wider view with an altered perspective. When the Roman Empire weakened and fell, the Church stepped into the breach and gradually organized and administered a kind of emergency State. Becoming rich and powerful, it began to dominate the economic sphere also, and proved the greatest of landlords, handling with skill and patience a great volume of business. At first the Benedictine monks upheld the lonely ideal of the dignity of labour. Then with the rise of the towns came the merchant guilds with their religious affinities and their strict rules for enforcing honest work and honest dealing. The moral aim was thus clearly prescribed for industrial enterprise. Education was, of course, pre-eminently a Church concern, and even the fierce fighting spirit of the times was disciplined and raised through the ideals of knighthood and chivalry. The Church thus occupied a central position in regard to human institutions generally, and throughout the centuries

its influence was exerted to secure that every significant human activity should have a core of moral purpose.

In modern times the relations between our institutions have become discordant, and at first sight it may seem that the moral aim has been swallowed up altogether. But nothing is ever really lost. The present grows out of the past, and must be interpreted primarily in terms of the past, and, if we find the interpretation difficult, we may still hope that the formal unity of the past will eventually usher in the deeper organic unity of the future. In the case of the State, at least, the original association has never been entirely obscured, even by the dust of its conflict with the Church. The first kings of strong national states claimed to rule by "divine right"—primarily, no doubt, that they might subordinate the Church, but also to obtain moral support for their pretensions. Then, although the duties of a modern state are bewildering in their variety, yet the prime duty of "keeping order" is clear, and its moral and social importance so great as to be most widely recognized and respected. Education, which is now a State as well as a Church concern, has a moral aspect that can scarcely be disregarded. Hence there is still a fairly obvious, if uneasy, partnership between Church and State.

A clear view of our modern industrial system is much harder to obtain. The early efforts of both Church and State to regulate the course of industry were well meant, but unfortunately, a reaction set in, and business asserted its complete freedom and independence. Hence theory readily assumes the a-moral or dubiously moral character of economic activity. On the other hand it is clear that industry is indispensable in providing for imperative human needs, and what is indispensable cannot be morally indifferent. If we think of the busy lives of Huguenots, Puritans and Quakers, and of their descendants in (let us say) the modern American business world, we shall realize how strongly and continuously industry has attracted men of strict moral standards. Many critics freely recognize the connexion, but attack business on this very ground. Artists, for instance, have a grudge against commerce and also against the churches, and blame one for upholding the other, while socialists are apt to follow a similar line of thought. This assumption certainly appears more soundly based than the first, but we need to enquire more closely why men of strict moral principles should be attracted by business and also why thoughtful critics should disapprove as they do.

If it be conceded that poverty is a moral and social problem of magnitude, it will appear natural that earnest men of action should labour and organize to overcome it. But we never know how critics will react mentally to any question that involves the problem of evil. The thinker, it appears, is not impressed with

the reality of evil because he regards it as an aspect of that particularity of things from which he is eternally escaping into the realm of universal and unchangeable ideas. He may discourse of evil as the shadow or negation of the Good, or perhaps as a sort of foil to set off the crystal purity of the All, but he regards it as a vanishing factor in speculation, something to be explained away rather than explained. The artist, on the other hand, owns no allegiance to pure Thought, which he must picture as presiding over some hopelessly remote and chilly limbo, which might, indeed, serve as a congenial home for evil. Certainly, he fails notably to discern evil in the hearts of individual men and women, even when with patience and cunning he reveals the workings of primitive human passions and impulses. He deplores the badness and madness of laws and institutions looming horrific in the background of life, and thinks that we would all be good and simple but for these external corrupting influences. This is all very baffling and disappointing. The problem of evil is surely not "uninteresting", but the critics are "uninterested" or feel only a fitful and unsteady interest. It is fair to add that the blindness or innocence of the artist and the thinker is only part of a common disability that is often hard to explain. For instance, when an evil is inevitable, or is widely regarded as such, we mostly remain insensitive to it. This surely has been the case with poverty. It is only very recently that any general solution of the problem of poverty has appeared at all possible, and so perhaps we do not appreciate as we should the aim and effort of organized industry. The ideal may not be a very lofty one, but the struggle is necessary and must be maintained. It may be consistent with narrowness and hardness of outlook, but should not be dismissed as either a-moral or immoral.

Though the study of history can hardly fail to widen our outlook on these questions, it does not, of course, furnish us with infallible conclusions, since different minds will interpret the past in different ways. We must be guided also by reflection on our own experience and that of our contemporaries. There is evidence nowadays of a new seriousness and a new general disposition to seek earnestly for the unity that must underlie the illustrious trinity of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. The artist sees that art has become estranged from morality and he confesses that it suffers loss by the separation. The scientist and the religious thinker are agreed that there is not and cannot be any fundamental conflict between science and religion. As for philosophy, it has always envisaged some sort of synthesis between art, science, and religion, and must therefore not fall behind, but should rather aspire to lead the general movement. A renewed consideration of the problem of evil and of the inner experiences that bear upon it might do much to stimulate and

strengthen the mind for this high endeavour. The doctrine of a higher self opposed to a lower self in conflict with it would be no new thing in philosophy, but it is a conception that demands more than the perfunctory treatment that it has so far evoked.

Our concern in this article, however, is not so much with the general problem as with its social aspects. The aim so far has been to represent the State and the industrial system alike as facing specific evils of magnitude and having their form and function and their human importance determined by the power of these evils. It remains to consider more attentively the position of the churches, which have waged so many brave campaigns against the powers of darkness. When the opposing evils have been very great they have even unduly shaped church policies, and we can see a tendency for particular churches to concentrate on particular evils. If this were all, the churches would stand on much the same level as our other institutions. But a church should so fight against evil that it does not in the process become a mere fighting machine. It desires above all to be a true religious society, and so claims to be judged by an inner, and not by any outer standard. History, too, is not unfavourable to the view that the Church is much more than an organization. Should we not rather call it the mother of organizations, through its power to arouse and organize public opinion against evils to which it would otherwise remain indifferent?

It is implied in the above view of our institutions that their influence for good is only indirectly exerted, since they promote goodness only by diminishing evil. This should not be accounted too negative an opinion, if the power of the evils to be faced be taken into account. Yet it would be a pity if our institutions were identified with that kind of morality that ignores or opposes the claims of the gentler emotions and of the intellect. It is interesting to recall that both the mediæval Church and the modern State have felt it their duty to act as patrons to art and culture, and the tradition has been not ungenerously maintained by modern business magnates. Thus our leading institutions have avoided the reproach of championing too narrow and too rigid a standard. In these days they find it harder to avoid the other reproach of being too diffuse in their aims and activities. We all find it more difficult to "mind our own business" than to imagine other more profitable occupations and pursuits, and institutions evidently do not rise superior to this infirmity. If they express something of the greatness and many-sided aspiration of human nature, they also do not fail to reproduce its faults and weaknesses. On the whole, our institutions have great claims on our loyalty, which need not be blind, but should be sincere and cordial.

■

If a common moral basis were generally recognized for our institutions, what would be the practical effect? To the writer it seems that such recognition would invest them with a commanding dignity and importance. At the same time it would tend to check any undue extension of their powers, because it would pin each to the task of controlling a specific evil, or set of evils. However, the thought goes considerably beyond the mark. A fully-armed and complete theory cannot be conjured up by this short article, which attempts only to distinguish as clearly as possible some simple, as distinct from logical, elements of these complex human problems. It is left to the reader to decide whether the attempt has been sufficiently well directed.

REVIEWS.

THE PLATONIC EPISTLES; Translated, with Introduction and Notes, by J. Harward. Cambridge University Press; 1932. Price: 15s. net.

The foremost champion of Homeric orthodoxy, in connexion with the Odyssey, is a retired Indian Civil Service officer, living now in St. Andrews (Scotland), who has long since passed the limit of three score years and ten. And here, at this end of the world, in the person of Mr. Harward, we have another, also stricken in years, who, after serving the Empire as Director of Education in Ceylon, spends the evening of his days to equally good purpose in Platonic studies. As recently as 1928 a translation of the *Epinomis* came from his hand, and now we have a book of nearly 250 pages devoted to the Platonic Epistles.

Interest in this collection of thirteen letters has been somewhat lively these last few years; there is a sort of ebb and flow in these things, it seems. As recently as 1925, L. A. Post issued through the Oxford University Press a Translation, with Introduction and Notes, which, short as both were, yet contrived to pack into them a vast amount of more than doubtful logic and unabashed special pleading. From the Cambridge Press comes this larger and more complete work; but by their title pages both Post and Harward are revealed as products of Oxford.

After an Introduction of nearly 100 pages, follows a Translation of the letters in their canonical order (the only sensible way; disturbance of that order, whether in sacred or in profane literature, is a mere irritating vanity, serving no useful end); lastly, Notes and Special Introductions to each letter (77 pages)—certainly a generous allowance of historical and exegetical comment on the ancient matter, which covers only 64 pages in its English dress. But it is no case of an intolerable deal of sack to but one half-pennyworth of bread. Indeed, *mea quidem sententia*, the shoe is on the other foot, since I cannot bring myself to set much by the contents of the letters themselves, whether history or philosophy; whereas Mr. Harward's Notes are illuminating and his Introductions still more so, especially in respect of the assumed historical setting of the letters. As he remarks, they "only become intelligible when studied in their proper

historical setting"; and, quite independently of the debated question of authenticity, his sixty pages on Sicilian affairs deserve high praise for lucidity and readableness, not least also for the helpful Maps and Genealogical Tables.

It is on the thirty pages of discussion of the general question of genuineness, supplemented by the Special Introductions, that criticism chiefly turns. Are these letters what they proclaim themselves to be, namely, genuine offspring of the brain of the man whose name they bear—one of the greatest names in history, that of "Plato the Wise"—or are they bastard children, the paternity of which is foisted upon him by the interest or the malice of friend or enemy? If their pedigree were established beyond cavil, then, of course, we should welcome them with the most lively satisfaction, especially perhaps in this our own garrulous age, never so happy as when rummaging among the faded contents of secret drawers and nosing in long-locked dispatch-boxes.

Mr. Harward, in his Preface, confesses that after struggling through a period of somewhat half-hearted scepticism he has settled down finally in a "conservative view of all thirteen letters, with the exception of the first". The arguments he advances in support of this position have a familiar ring—"If Plato was not the author, who was?" (p. 164, and cp. p. 72); "the abrupt style is too clever a touch for a Greek forger" (p. 171, cp. p. 166); "if a forgery, a most clever imitation of Plato's manner" (p. 172, and so also on p. 228); "most unlikely to have been written by a forger" (p. 174); "but if it is a forgery, it is the work of a clever forger" (p. 181)—and so, on page after page. If it is grudgingly conceded that our forger may have made shift on occasion to write stuff in harmony with his assumed character and circumstances, he could not, we are warned, have kept it up. "Such a highly dramatic fragment of autobiography (the reference is to letter 7) might have been thought out by an Athenian Browning, if we can suppose such a writer to have been capable of maintaining throughout so long a work a style so unusual. But the supposition is so improbable that it does not call for discussion" (p. 72). "A forger would have betrayed himself again and again" (p. 177). Plato, Mr. Harward reminds us, "had a gift for imaginative fiction" (p. 190); the trouble is, that it seems to be assumed that he had a monopoly of it. But what, in Heaven's name, do we know of ancient forgers and their equipment? And why has the ancient forger always to be such an egregious ass? The unfortunate wretch has no chance at all with his critics, who play all the while with a double-headed coin; between the too good a job for so scurvy a knave, and the good enough for the likes of him, the poor duffer comes heavily to ground. It is just the one-sided game, now a little out of fashion, played with so much gusto by a certain type of pundit in Homeric criticism.

The brunt falls upon letters 7 and 8. The former exceeds in length all the others taken together, and purports to tell the story of Plato's own youthful ambitions and experiences in politics, as well as the details of his alleged visits to Dionysius at Syracuse. In letter 8 we get the *reductio ad absurdum* of Plato's political wisdom, in the fantastic advice recommending to distempered Syracuse a political nostrum, in the shape of a constitutional triple monarchy. On these Mr. Harward writes: "The critical world could not long remain blind to the fact that the contents of the two letters were sufficient proof of their genuineness" (p. 189). One used to be taught to expect a bad mark for that kind of argument; but times have changed, it seems, and methods also. To use his own phrase (p. 63), it is "mere bluff", besides being bad logic.

The controversy on these documents, Mr. Harward reminds us, "has been carried on with some acrimony" (p. 77). That is true; there has been altogether too much of the "win, tie, or wrangle" spirit in connexion with it. But Mr. Harward has nothing of that. His logic may be a little shaky in places, but his controversial manner is unimpeachable. And upon the whole he does not exhibit the extravagances of others who work the same subjective method, as though it was the predestined reagent of literary analysis. In letter 10, for example, which in the original consists of less than seventy words, Post assures us that he detects "characteristic touches of Platonic style and thought", which illustrate Plato's "ability to stamp even the briefest note with the vivid impress of his personality". Mr. Harward is not guilty of this solemn nonsense; though at times he comes perilously near it. One cannot but think of Mr. Chesterton's appeal, which is well worth pondering: "Do not talk such bosh. I implore you, I supplicate you not to talk such bosh. Utterly and absolutely abolish all such bosh—and we may yet begin to discuss these questions properly".

But I would not end on this note, about a book that is a credit to scholarship in Australia. Mr. Harward deserves well of our Republic of Letters. His book is the best presentment in English of the whole case of the Platonic Epistles, and will not easily be superseded. If only we might have had the Greek text printed at the end of it!

W. J. WOODHOUSE.

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF MODERN SCIENCE. By C. E. M. Joad. George Allen and Unwin Limited, London; 1932. Price: 10s. 6d. net.

In this volume we have a lucid analysis and a masterly criticism of several books recently published. These represent a modern break-away of science from that mechanistic view of the universe which so largely dominated the physicists of the nineteenth century. The leading spirits in this movement are Professor Eddington, whose two books, *The Nature of the Physical World* and *Science and the Unseen World*, have reached a high degree of popularity; Sir James Jeans, who has stimulated a large number of people to study astronomy by his remarkable work on *The Mysterious Universe*; and Bertrand Russell, whose *Analysis of Mind*, together with his *Outline of Philosophy*, challenges the thoughtful reader to equally high flights of the imagination. The work of Joad may be read with greater appreciation, of course, if these three authors are studied first. But, failing that, we find his quotations from each of them so logically selected that we get a very illuminating view of the main drift of their contents.

The position generally taken up by these writers will recall to many the philosophical theories of Kant, Berkeley and Bergson. They all alike teach that the world of phenomena is not real; and that reality in the strict sense must be looked for in *noumena*, of which the familiar world of sense is but the symbol. In other words, there is a world of sense and a world of science: one is the familiar scene of tables and chairs and other material forms; the other is the unseen realm of atoms, electrons, etheric waves, magnetic forces and so on. This is known only to the scientific mind, and yet not directly, but by inference. Neither of these worlds, however, is real in the objective sense. As a matter of fact, for Eddington, they give but a very poor indication of what the real world or universe is. Behind both of them the great Reality hides. This for him is a "spiritual substratum" in which the worlds of sense and science are

"embedded". But there seems to be some mysterious restriction placed upon its power of expression. It is like a mighty spirit longing for self-realization, yet is held back by the clumsiness of matter and the mediocre powers of molecules.

But the mind of man comes to the help of this "unknown something" and sets it free, or at least partly so. Here it is that the shade of Kant moves the hand of Eddington; for, in the words of Joad, the "world of sense experience, and the same may be said of the world of science, is the product of the categories of our minds, the features we discern in it being the features we ourselves have put there" (30). Inded the Professor goes so far as to claim that there may be a plurality of worlds possessing potential reality, but they are locked perhaps for ever in the matrix of mystery because of the absence of consciousness, human or otherwise, which might bring them to birth. This leads Joad to say in summing up the position of Eddington: "Mind, then, is the final guarantor of reality, and to be real is to be known by a mind" (31).

Sir James Jeans goes to equally extreme lengths in his Idealism, but approaches the problems of science in the rationalist rather than in the empirical frame of mind. His conclusions as to the nature of the reality in question bear a "family likeness", however, to those of Professor Eddington. "Physics deals with abstractions" (52). But these are not constructed by the mind of the scientist; they denote "selected aspects of an independent reality". Our world is a "world of shadows" cast by the Great Reality upon the "Walls of our Cave". In the immensity of the universe man is but a speck of conscious matter. But he has the capacity to look out from his bit of "burnt-out ash" upon the vast and undefined Reality about him. He can fit everything into a mathematical mould. Indeed, the whole universe is an example, perhaps the first, of pure mathematics. If, then, it requires mathematical minds to unravel it, a similar type of mind must have put it together. But the knowledge arrived at by man is not the result of his study of nature, but comes from the "reasoning reflections of his own mind" (61). Yet the universe which he discovers has not merely been constructed by a mind, but "consists", in Jean's words, "of pure thought, the thought of what for want of a wider word, we must describe as a mathematical thinker" (61).

Bertrand Russell's view is first cousin to those we have considered in the foregoing cases. For him our knowledge of matter is indirect. We do not see the atom. Our consciousness of its existence is conditional upon its radiation of energy. Matter for Russell is merely a "convenient formula for describing what happens where it isn't" (86). He says: "Everything that we can directly observe of the physical world happens inside our heads, and consists of 'mental' events in at least one sense of the word 'mental'." But he dispenses with "consciousness" and holds that the mind is made up of discrete sensations and images. And there is for him, as for the others we have considered, a background of reality. But the gulf between this and matter is narrowed down until the two merge together in his "neutral monism". "The stuff of the world may be called physical or mental, or both or neither, as we please; in fact, the words serve no purpose" (95).

It seems, then, that these three Idealists generally agree that Reality, in the strict sense, escapes both the ordinary observer and the trained scientist alike, in that it is not objective. For one it is a universal mind that is continuous with our own consciousness; for the second it is a vast mathematical concept; and for the third it is "neutral stuff". The processes by which they reach their respective conclusions differ, but they all agree that our world is not objectively

real. The scientist's world is of the same order. We are told that the mind itself creates what it perceives. The position viewed generally gives the impression that the world of sense is what we perceive; the world of science is what we think about our perceptions; but the things we perceive are not there till we think about them, and when we think about them, they are not there. It is this that leads Joad to charge the scientists in question with self-generated confusion in their respective theories.

In his chapters on *Sense data and physical objects*, *Sense data and scientific objects*, and *Physical objects and scientific objects*, he shows that our knowledge of physical and scientific objects comes by way of sense data, however produced; and that if no objects existed external to ourselves we would never think of them at all. He stresses again and again the fact that we cannot actually make either physical or scientific objects parts of our experience. This being so, they are external to ourselves; hence the idea that they are projections of our own minds is contradicted by the acceptance of the brain and nerve cells as real entities with physical properties of texture and colour (148). If the objects in the sense world are only subjective, must not the brain be the same? But the impossibility of such a position becomes at once apparent. Instead of creating the world, the mind depends upon its sense data to direct it to the "non-material world of thought" (183). And with the ascending stages of evolution men become less and less dependent upon sense data as an approach to reality. The time may come when a race of beings will be able to apprehend reality by a method even more direct than that of the senses, and go straight to its secret depths by a mystic consciousness which as yet is not fully developed.

In the concluding chapters on *Conceptions of Reality* and their criticisms, *A theory of Value*, and *Philosophy and the temper of Science*, Joad seeks to guard the worlds of ethics, æsthetics and religion from the implications of Idealism which he has condemned. For him there is the Great Reality beyond all that the scientists have called by a similar name. This is God, who is not a mathematical concept, not continuous with the consciousness of man, but One who is in no sense responsible for evil which so baffles the human race: a Being in whom all the elements of goodness, love and joy exist in perfection. Man may aspire to become something like God, but he can do this best by "mystical experience", which, in the author's opinion, "has achieved . . . the fullest knowledge of the world of value of which man is capable". He emphasizes the "otherness" of the Supreme Being and rightly considers that to make him continuous with man shatters the very foundations of reverence and confers upon humanity a dignity to which it has no claim. Mysticism has the power to transcend the narrow bounds of modern Realism. Joad honours Eddington and Jeans for their effort to unveil a Reality at the back of things that is worthy of man's admiration and even akin to his nature. But in so doing "they have remembered their wishes but forgotten their science" (339). Many will wonder whether or not the same thing is made possible by our author's acceptance of Mysticism as the highest avenue of approach to the Deity. So many strange reports have been brought back by mystics that we often feel that science has been ignored.

Many, however, will thank our author for his defence of the old and familiar world of things quite outside our minds and external to all that we are or think. We shall still be able to keep our tables and chairs while the atoms go on with their dancing. But the book is not bounded by modern Realism. Although a spade is a spade and science may know in part and yet accurately, there

exists for Joad a transcendent Reality which he admits is divine. This is beyond all human values or categories; it is God. And here the book brings reassurance to those who have even in the simplest manner believed all their lives in the existence of a divine Being. Relation to this Reality does not imply absorption, as many mystics have supposed, when we pass from the realm of material things. But the thought of a perfect Being somewhere transcending the universe He has made, inspires man to a reverent wonder. He ever seeks to find the truth concerning this great postulate by means of ethical activities, appreciations of the Beautiful, scientific knowledge and mystical visions. He may often draw the wrong conclusions. But what of that? It is the challenge of the Unknown that makes thinking worth while. Men are obeying the age-old laws of thought: some in one world and some in another. But there may come a time when they shall emerge from their different routes into a spacious unity of thought and feeling which may prove to be of more value than a unity of being.

VICTOR BELL.

A CHARTER FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. Drafted by Charles A. Beard. Part I: Report of the Commission on the Social Studies, American Historical Association. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York; 1932.

This is the preliminary report of a Commission on Direction appointed by the American Historical Society to investigate social studies in schools. It has been drafted by Mr. C. A. Beard and endorsed by the Commission. As it stands it is a preliminary inquiry into the teaching of social sciences in schools.

The first section deals with the requirements of scholarship. It is a noble utterance. The hands may be the hands of the fifteen gentlemen appointed by the American Historical Society, but the voice is the voice of Charles Beard. The author goes on to consider the nature of Social Disciplines. Under this head he considers the difficulties which environment places in the way of the scientific outlook. For teachers are not infallible; "they are themselves part of the drift they seek to describe". So does our social milieu make cowards of us all.

But is this a bad thing? Has not the realistic world a right to be heard by those who profess to explain it to others? It is "the great man problem" all over again—this time in the realm of education. If the Great Man does not fit his environment, then his environment rejects him; and, for practical purposes, he becomes one of Gray's "mute inglorious Miltons"—born to fulminate unheard. This may be why the Common Man sometimes is more right than the Professor. Mr. Beard points out that "William Lloyd Garrison, a fanatical agitator in Boston, was closer to the verdict of history than John C. Calhoun, the most logical and intelligent defender of slavery in the South". So, in another connection, Lord John Russell is credited with the remark: "All the wise men were on one side, and all the damned fools on the other, and begad Sir, the damned fools were right."

Thus the educator must take account of reality. Civic instruction must emphasize the changing nature of society and the fact of industrialism with its dynamic effects, its urban tendencies, and its increasingly rational attitude. Also it must take into account the system of government. It cannot ignore controversial issues in politics unless it consents to a conspiracy of silence. Teaching of this kind must expect to be hampered, not only by the inherent

difficulties of the problems, but also by the intemperate attitude of large sections of society to any scientific discussion of certain issues. It is curious to find Mr. Beard's own confession of faith enshrined in a sentence in this section. "The aim of civic instruction under this head is to strengthen democratic institutions." His previous pages would suggest that he might have substituted "examine" for "strengthen" in this sentence.

The section on the "Climate of American Ideas" is interesting as an attempt by a well known liberal publicist to evaluate the social creed of the United States. One wonders whether Mr. Beard is not a little too hopeful in describing his own outlook to his fellow countrymen; for it can hardly be claimed that Mr. Beard is a typical citizen of the United States. He is, indeed, one of the very best types of citizen in any country. This gives his deliverances in this little book peculiar interest for the educators, not only of his own country, but of the world.

G. V. PORTUS.

DE LUTHER À WAGNER: ESSAI DE PSYCHOLOGIE ETHNIQUE.

By N. Klugmann and M. Dumesnil de Gramont. Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1931. Two Volumes; Volume I, pp. 227; Volume II, pp. 222. Price: 40 fr.

This is an attempt to describe the psychology of a people. For the sake of the world's security, it is doubtless highly desirable, if not necessary, that France should come to understand Germany. The authors of "De Luther à Wagner" have undertaken to reveal the genius of the German nation.

They have started out from the proposition that, in the minds of its greatest sons, the mind of any people is to be found writ large. The premise seems a very unsound one. It would appear that, if one wishes to discover the characteristics peculiar to a nation or a people, one should seek them among ordinary men rather than among the extraordinary. The ordinary average German, highly suggestible and the slave of custom and convention as are ordinary average citizens of any community, is surely more likely to manifest typically German qualities than are his country's geniuses, since geniuses are usually rather contemptuous of custom and convention. Is it not the deliberate cultivation of uniformity which is responsible for the paucity of genius in America?

However, if we pass over this premise, we reach a number of interesting studies of the great men of four centuries. Theology is represented by Luther, art by Durer and Holbein, philosophy by Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer, music by Beethoven and Wagner, poetry by Goethe and Schiller, statecraft by Frederick II and Bismark, and history by Mommsen. I list the men dealt with to convey some notion of the magnitude of the task which the authors have set themselves.

Each of these studies is very interesting; some of them are little masterpieces of character analysis. In all cases an examination of the life and work of these great Germans brings the authors to the one conclusion. We know at last how it comes about that representatives of the nation renowned, and justly renowned, for its simple and beautiful home life, for the honour in which it holds its philosophers and poets, for its love of music and the arts, could be guilty of the frightful atrocities which, a few years ago, made the adjective "German" synonymous with any other adjective meaning "fiendish", "bestial", "brutal" or the like. Our authors are assuming,

of course, that the propaganda with which we were poisoned during the war, and for which intelligence departments and newspapers should never be forgiven, was honest truth. The key to the German enigma lies, we learn, in the fact that, whereas all the rest of us are, occasionally and in our own small and harmless ways, examples of dual personality, the German is the outstanding case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, with a great deal more Hyde than Jekyll. The pun in that last phrase was not committed deliberately.

On the whole the essay is rather unconvincing, if very ingenious. Although Frederick II declared that "one must be protean", and Goethe said "I am both Faust and Mephistopheles"; although Fichte claimed that "it is possible to deny, theoretically, the existence of God and still remain a true Christian", and although Klopstock, profoundly religious poet, was not only a "*séraphin*", but also a "*libertin*" to such good effect that he was strongly suspected of "*Kussmanie*", it is scarcely safe to conclude that the German is any more a dual personality than anyone else, and that, in the words of the authors, "*c'est avec une sorte d'orgueilleuse volupté que le Germain pratique cette gymnastique qui déconcerte les esprits des autres races*".

In short, I suspect that these two psychologists knew what they were looking for, and consequently found it. But to follow them in the hunt is always interesting and very diverting. Wherefore it is easy to condone the pre-perception which determined the perception.

It may be news to some others, as it was to me, that Browning was not the first to plead that once both God and he knew what he meant, and that he had forgotten. Klopstock used the excuse before our English poet, though he could hardly have needed it more.

C. R. McRAE.

A CLASSIFICATION OF VOCATIONAL TESTS OF DEXTERITY.

By A. S. Weiss Long and T. H. Pear. Report No. 64. Industrial Health Research Board. London: H.M. Stationery Office; 1932. Price: 1s. 3d. net.

As the term "skill" is often used loosely and vaguely, the authors—the second of whom has already contributed extensively to the subject—attempt a definition of the term with admirable clarity and conciseness. The varieties of possible hand movements are treated and the factors involved in the term "motor capacity". It is agreed by the writers that no general or common factor in this field has hitherto been made manifest. With this one may join issue; inter-correlations of motor tests are admittedly not high, but, as may also be pointed out, neither are the specific tests of such a composite as the Army Alpha or other tests of intelligence. Again, on the other hand, some work carried out in the Sydney laboratory appears to show certain groupings of fair agreement, as in types of reaction-time experiments, and those involving certain types of specific factors, such as dexterity. It might be possible to assemble such a group of motor factors, each of which might be tested out by special limited teams of tests. The writers, however, appear to favour tests of a complex nature rather than those of fairly simple factors, and the principle of "gestalt" is invoked in support of this thesis.

A brief description of a number of tests makes the work valuable both to those engaged in the practical work of vocational guidance and selection as well as in the preliminary work of trying out suitable tests. These have been brought together from all available sources. No worker in the field of vocational psychology could dispense with

such a compendium. It is to be hoped that such a handbook as this might be followed by others in different fields, notably that of temperament and will.

A. H. MARTIN.

THE ATTITUDES OF PRISONERS AS A FACTOR IN REHABILITATION. By Henry E. Field. Vol. 157, Publication 2484. Reprint American Academy of Science. Philadelphia, 1931.

The writer of the article is a Rockefeller Fellow in the social sciences and shows himself admirably equipped for the task which involves a socio-psychological approach. Various phases of prison problems are briefly dealt with by him and the reprint is provocative and general rather than full and conclusive. One most interesting feature is the mention of the use of women workers in prison hospitals and of social workers in the prisons themselves in certain American prisons. Such an experiment is so far unheard of under British prisons systems, which still retain traces of the stern repressive methods of the "du Cane" era. There can be no doubt that the introduction of the softening influences of the presence of good women, who are neither over-sentimental in their attitude nor over-masculine in temperament, would do much to help a number of prisoners towards a right attitude to reformation and rehabilitation in society. An immense amount of good would also result from the use of a psychiatrist and a psychologist among prisoners. The article leads one to the conclusion that the social problems of our age are still largely up in the air in Australia, that we are far behind America in this field and that a scientific approach to them here has yet to be made. The foundation of a society for mental hygiene in Victoria and the recent steps to form one in New South Wales, however, lead us to hope that Australia may soon follow the American lead in this direction.

A. H. MARTIN.

LEGENDS AND MYSTERIES OF THE MAORI. By Charles A. Wilson. London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd; 1932. Pp. 240. Price: 8s. 6d. net.

This book is a collection of tales and other material dealing with the ancient Maori life, mainly covering sources already published, but containing some fresh stories obtained by the author from native friends. The narratives, with their strong dramatic touch, provide very interesting reading for the non-specialist and portray the loves and hates, the warring and the magicking of the olden days.

The popular style of the book, however, has necessitated in places the sacrifice of accuracy to interest of plot, and the canons of European taste. This, together with the note of mysticism which creeps in at times, renders the work of little value as a scientific contribution.

RAYMOND FIRTH.

DESUGGESTION FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF HEALTH, HAPPINESS AND SUCCESS. By E. Tietjens. Translated from German by E. and C. Paul. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London; 1931. Pp. 586. Price: 18s.

The blue books of happiness have been written by medical practitioners, psychologists, social workers and others, but, despite their accumulated guidance, the problem of providing a universal panacea has yet to be solved. This author advocates education to prove to

the individual that he has no free will and that his thoughts and actions are determined by the law of pleasure-pain. He traverses the whole field of psychological knowledge in an attempt to clear the reader's mind of fancies by appealing to his critical faculties. Tietjens asserts that our only motive in life is to secure pleasure and avoid pain and discomfort. If this be true one can only regret that so many of the Christian ideals and inspirations have such a mundane basis. The book contains another group of involved and difficult technical terms which make reading the book a tedious task. There is little justification for adding to the voluminous vocabulary of psychological terms which overlap and conflict.

H. F. BENNING.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

PHILOSOPHY. Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy. Published quarterly by Macmillan & Co. Annual subscription: 14s.

Vol. VII, No. 27. Theism and Recent Philosophical Speculation: C. F. D'Arcy. Oxford Moralists: Ian Gallie. Entropy and Evolution: F. Johnstone. The Aquinate Proofs of the Existence of God: V. Burdwood Evans. The Present Position in Psychology: James Drever. The Size-Factor in Art: E. M. Rowell.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Columbia University. Published fortnightly. Four dollars a year.

Vol. XXIX, No. 10. May 12, 1932. The Displacement of the Sense-Datum: D. S. Mackay. On the Instrumental Analysis of Thought: Carlos Kling. Epistemology and Symbolism: M. Whitcomb Hess. No. 11. May 26. The Prestige of the Infinite: George Santayana. Report of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association: A. Cornelius Benjamin. No. 12. June 9. Substances, Events, and Facts: L. Susan Stebbing. A Critical Analysis of the Concept of Introspection: Marten Ten Hoor. No. 13. June 23. Dualisms Good and Bad (I): Arthur O. Lovejoy. A Spinozistic Fancy: B. A. G. Fuller. No. 14. July 7. Physics and Metaphysics: E. B. McGilvary. Dualisms Good and Bad (II): Arthur O. Lovejoy. No. 15. The Inadequacy of the Hedonistic Interpretation of Pessimism: Cornelius Krusé. On Zeno's Paradox of Motion: Ralph B. Winn.

MIND. Vol. XLI, No. 163. Probability: Axioms: W. E. Johnson. Truth and Falsity: G. F. Stout. Two Problems about Duty (III): W. A. Pickard-Cambridge.

PSYCHE. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Published quarterly. Price: 5s.

No. 24. April, 1932. Psyche 1920-1932: Editorial. Word Magic—The Technological Approach. Freudian Dynamics: S. Buchanan. Social Psychology as an Experimental Science: O. E. Oeser. Psychical Researchers as Spiritual Logicians: George Lawton. The New Witchcraft: E. J. Dingwall.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. Official Organ of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. Baillière, Tindall and Cox. Annual subscription: 30s.

Vol. XIII. Parts 1 and 2. Psycho-Analysis of Primitive Cultural Types: By Geza Roheim. This contribution comprises (1) Introduc-

tion; (2) Psycho-Analytic Technique and Field Anthropology; (3) Children of the Desert; (4) Sexual Life in Central Australia; (5) Totemic Ritual; (6) The Psychology of the Central Australian Culture Area; (7) Tauhau and the Mwadare; (8) Doketa; (9) Super-Ego and Group-Ideal; (10) The National Character of the Somali.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan. Annual subscription: L. 50.30.

Vol. XXIV, No. 2. Riprendendo il problema criteriologico: Amato Masnovo. La quantità continua dell'individuo materiale e l'individualità: Michele Fatta. Alberto Magno e la polemica averroistica: Amato Masnovo. La diagnostica della religione positiva in Tommaso Campanella: Romano Amerio. L'argomento a priori dell'esistenza di Dio nel "Nuovo saggio" di A. Rosmini: A. Bestetti.

ARCHIVIO GENERALE DI NEUROLOGIA, PSICHIATRIA E PSICOANALISI. Edited by M. Levi-Bianchini. Naples. Annual subscription: Eight dollars.

Vol. XIII, No. 1. Sulla possibilità di produrre nel campo psichico energia radiante: L. Batoni. Connessioni bianche dell'antimuro umano; G. Pintus. Le crisi epilettiche in rapporto ai fenomeni naturali: Alfonso Fresca. Comportamento degli istinti in latenza durantegli stati di malattia e di convalescenza: Mario Peserico.

ANNALI DELLA R. SCUOLA NORMALE SUPERIORE DI PISA. Macmillan & Co., London. Subscription: L. 80.

Series II, Vol. 1. No. 2. Recentiores, non deteriores: G. Pasquali. Esame di una nuova dimostrazione dell'esistenza di Dio: A. Carlini. Wilhelm Heinse ed il suo "Ardinghello": G. V. Amoretti.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW. Washington Square East, New York City. Subscription: Four dollars *per annum*.

Vol. IX, No. 2. Divorce and Covenant not to Sue for Maintenance: George J. Webber. The Copyright Situation as Affecting Radio Broadcasting: Lawrence P. Simpson. International Legislation on Social Questions: William M. Hepburn. No. 4. Preliminary Questions in Statutory Interpretation: Frederick J. de Sloovere. Equitable Mortgages: William F. Walsh. The Nationality of Married Women: Gladys Harrison.

THE ECONOMIC RECORD. Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Melbourne University Press. Price: 5s.

Vol. VIII, No. 14. Economic Status of Empire Tariff Preference: H. R. Rodwell. Farm Overhead Charges in New Zealand: I. W. Weston. The Unemployment Problem in Germany: E. R. Walker. Bulk Handling of Wheat in Australia: F. S. Alford. The Transport Situation in New Zealand: H. B. Smith. Age Distribution of Australian Population: H. J. Exley. The New Zealand Economic Problem: A. G. B. Fisher. The New Zealand Economic Problem: D. B. Copland.

THE HUMAN FACTOR. Journal of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology.

Vol. VI, No. 5. The Accident-Prone Driver: Walter V. Bingham. Vocational Guidance—The Birmingham Experiment: E. P. Allen. A Study of Consumer Preference: W. J. Warner. Some Notes on Incen-

tives in Industry: Christopher A. Lee. The Worker's Point of View—III. Imagination and Rationalization: Louis Kahn. No. 6. Vocational Guidance for Secondary Schools: C. A. A. Parkinson. The Institute's Evidence on the Civil Service. The Worker's Point of View—IV. Wages in the Mining Industry: J. H. Mitchell. The Resistance of Employees to Co-Partnership Schemes: Frances Gregg. No. 7. An Experiment in the Lighting of Jute Mills. The Value of a Short Test for the Selection of Workers: M. S. Munro and W. Spielman Raphael. The Cost of Traffic Obstruction: A. E. King. The Worker's Point of View—V. Tools and Tackle: W. F. Watson.

PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Journal of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Vol. V, No. 6. The Insular Pacific: E. S. Craighill Handy. Regional Labor Problems: Francis G. Wilson. Pacific Trends: The Editor. No. 7. Survey of Silver: Herbert M. Batter. New Zealand: N. E. Coad. When East First Met West: Kenneth Saunders. Colonial Policy—A Review.

BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT NATIONAL D'ORIENTATION PROFESSIONNELLE. Musée Pédagogique, 41, Rue Gay Lussac, Paris. Annual subscription: 25 francs.

MENTAL HYGIENE BULLETIN. Published by the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, 450 Seventh Avenue, New York.

THE MORPETH REVIEW. The St. John's College Press, Morpeth, N.S.W. Annual subscription: 7s. 6d.

Vol. II, No. 20. June, 1932. The Christian Attitude to Communism: E. H. Burgmann. India Today: W. Ashley-Brown. Approach to Disarmament: F. W. Wood. Disarmament Conference: Professor Bailey. Law and Liberty: Basil Helmore. Spirit in the World: Bishop Crotty. Religion and an Anthropologist: A. P. Elkin. Fellowship: A. De Pledge Sykes. A Shakespeare Discovery: R. C. Bald.

THE AUSTRALIAN INTERCOLLEGIAN. Published monthly by the Australian Christian Movement, 182 Collins Street, Melbourne.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA. Sydney. Published weekly. Price: 1s.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

AN ADVANCED TEST OF INTELLIGENCE. By Nora M. Hales. Issued by the Australian Council for Educational Research. Melbourne University Press. 1932. Price: 3s. 6d.

THE CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS. By Eric Farmer. Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons. 1932. Price: 3s. 6d.

BERKELEY'S AMERICAN SOJURN. By Benjamin Rand. Harvard University Press. 1932.

LOTZE ET SON INFLUENCE SUR LA PHILOSOPHIE ANGLO-SAXONNE. By Philippe Devaux. Archives de la Société Belge de Philosophie. 1930-1931.

HEGEL. Special Supplement to Vol. XXIII of the Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica. Centenary publication. University of the Sacred Heart. Milan. 1932.

HAMLET. A Study in Critical Method. By A. J. A. Waldock. Camb. Univ. Press. 1931. Price: 5s.

THE NEURAL ENERGY CONSTANT. A Study of the Bases of Consciousness. By John Bostock. George Allen and Unwin. 1932. Price: 6s.

NOTES AND NEWS.

The ANNUAL CONGRESS and the TENTH ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING of the Association was held in Sydney, at the University, on August 19th, 20th, 22nd and 23rd. On this occasion the date of the Congress was changed from May to August in order to make it coincide with the Congress of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science. The change proved eminently satisfactory. Members of our own Association from all the other States have been able to meet other scientists and to hear papers read upon other departments of knowledge. The co-operation of our members was naturally very close with those of Section J (Education, Psychology and Philosophy) of the larger body. The following was the programme:

FIRST SESSION—Friday, August 19th.

8 p.m.—Presidential Address—W. A. Merrylees, M.A., B.Litt. (Melbourne): "Judgment."

Chairman: Professor H. T. Lovell.

SECOND SESSION—Saturday, August 20th.

2.30 p.m.—W. M. Kyle, M.A.—(Brisbane): "A Psychological Theory of Mind."

N. Porter, B.A.—(Sydney): "Art and Philosophy."

R. R. M. King, B.A.—(Brisbane): "Beauty is Objectively Real."

Chairman: A. H. Martin.

THIRD SESSION—Saturday, August 20th.

7.45 p.m.—W. Macmahon Ball, B.A.—(Melbourne): "The Basis of Political Obedience."

F. W. Fowler, B.A.—(Sydney): "Legality and Ethics."

Chairman: Professor J. Anderson.

FOURTH SESSION—Monday, August 22nd (joint meeting with Section J.—Education, Psychology and Philosophy—Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science).

12 noon.—A. H. Martin, M.A., Ph.D.—(Sydney): "Problem Solving by Man and Mammals."

Chairman: Professor Francis Anderson.

FIFTH SESSION—Monday, August 22nd (joint meeting with Section J.—Education, Psychology and Philosophy—Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science).

2 p.m.—W. A. Merrylees, M.A., B.Litt.—(Melbourne): "Status of Sensa."

Professor John Anderson, M.A.—(Sydney): "Realism v. Relativism in Ethics."

Chairman: Professor W. R. Boyce Gibson.

SIXTH SESSION—Monday, August 22nd.

7.30 p.m.—Business Meeting: Annual Reports of the Hon. Secretary and Hon. Treasurer.

Chairman: W. A. Merrylees.

7.45 p.m.—Miss Ruth Griffiths, B.A., Dip.Ed., Ph.D.—(Brisbane): "Children's Phantasies."

G. T. Roscoe, M.A. (Teachers' Training College, Brisbane)—Report: "The Measurement of Temperament and Character."

Miss E. G. Robertson, B.A.—(Brisbane)—Report: "Two Cases of Colour Blindness."

G. F. K. Naylor, B.A., M.Sc.—(Sydney)—Report: "Some Aspects of an Investigation into the Capacity to Judge Small Distances."

Chairman: W. M. Kyle.

SEVENTH SESSION—Tuesday, August 23rd.

7.45 p.m.—Commemoration of the Tercentenary of the Birth of John Locke—Professor John Anderson, M.A.—(Sydney): "Locke."

Chairman: W. A. Merrylees.

With Section J (Education, Psychology and Philosophy) of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science.

THURSDAY, August 18th, 1932.

9.30 a.m.—Report of Australian Council of Educational Research: F. Tate.

10 a.m.—The Place of Research in Education: Professor Mackie, Dr. Cunningham.

11.30 a.m.—Educational Theory of John Dewey: Dr. Cole.

2 p.m.—Presidential Address: Professor Boyce Gibson.

3 p.m.—General Discussion: "Economic Depression."

FRIDAY, August 19th, 1932.

9.30 a.m.—Discussion: Economics in Secondary Schools.—Mr. Harris with Section G.

10.45 a.m.—Home Economics in Education: Miss M. D. Kidd.

11.30 a.m.—Discussion: Teaching of International Civics in Schools.—Professor Francis Anderson.

MONDAY, August 22nd, 1932.

9.30 a.m.—"Written Examinations": Professor Mackie.

10.15 a.m.—Norms in Algebra: H. J. Meldrum.

11.5 a.m.—"Psychopathology of Childhood": Professor Dawson.

Joint Sessions with the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy.

12 noon.—Problem-Solving in Men and Animals: Dr. A. H. Martin.

2 p.m.—Status of Sensa: W. A. Merrylees.

3.15 p.m.—Realism *versus* Relativism in Ethics: Professor John Anderson.

TUESDAY, August 23rd, 1932.

Joint Discussion with the Zoology Section.

9.30 a.m.—Evolution of Instincts.

We regret to have to record the severe illness of Mr. W. M. Kyle, Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Queensland. Mr. Kyle came to Sydney to attend the Association's Congress. On the day after his arrival he contracted pneumonia, and is still seriously ill, though there are now some signs of improvement.

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On Friday, 10th of June, the Sydney Local Branch held a meeting in celebration of the Centenary of the Death of Bentham. The following papers were read: *Utilitarianism*, by Professor John Anderson, M.A.; *The Panopticon*, by H. L. Harris, M.A., LL.B.; *Bentham as a Forerunner of the League of Nations*, by Professor A. H. Charteris, M.A., LL.B.; *Bentham and Public Health*, by Professor Harvey Sutton, O.B.E., M.D., B.Sc., D.P.H.; *Bentham and Colonisation*, by Professor R. C. Mills, LL.M., D.Sc.

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The TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PSYCHOLOGY was held this year in Copenhagen from August 22nd to 27th. The provisional list of papers numbered about 125. Those who are familiar with those volumes, *The Psychologies of 1925*, and *The Psychologies of 1930*, will realize how immensely important to the psychologist are these annual International Congresses. It seems very regrettable that no psychologist, either from New Zealand or Australia, has been able to attend. It is of the greatest importance for the science in these countries that at least one representative should be present at each congress.

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Volume III of that very valuable publication, *The Psychological Register*, which was to be issued from the Clark University Press in June, will contain twice as much data as Volume II. The first edition was issued in 1929, and proved invaluable. That first edition is now Volume II. Volume I is in preparation, and will include psychologists who died previous to the initiation of this Series and extending all the way back to early Greek psychologists. The editor of THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY is the Australian editor for *The Psychological Register*, and will be glad to be kept posted as to omissions to be made good or new matter to be inserted. All teachers of psychology will find this publication of the greatest use as a work of reference.
